Tanks in Ukraine and What They Tell Us About America in the Pacific

Germany’s insistence that the United States move first in the decision to send Ukraine: Tanks tells us much about security dynamics in Europe, but it also has implications for America’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific: it reveals the futility of hoping that Europe might soon stand on its own so that Washington can focus more on the Pacific theater.

Although the decision to send tanks to Ukraine was not something many expected, it did take longer than anticipated. However, the final result should increase the chances of victory for Ukraine. The deal was Clever By the U.S.’s willingness to lead, it announced it would supply Ukraine-made M1A2 Abrams tank tanks. However, these tanks require more robust maintenance and logistical support capabilities. Moreover, Washington will only provide 31 Abrams tanks—just 10 percent of what Ukraine has apparently Clearly indicated it needs—and they won’t arrive in any case for several months, meaning they probably won’t play any role in an Expected This spring, the Ukrainian counteroffensive.  

Washington is frustrated by the fact that Germany refused to supply tanks to America without America first. Berlin is the only candidate that has the economic, political, and technological heft to lead Europe. All other candidates are weak for different reasons. Great Britain is becoming less attractive “great,” We are grateful in large part for BrexitIt is forcing its military to shrink. France has the will to lead but lacks the economic and military strength; Macron’s Engagement to expand military spending from 2024-30 will take years to yield results. Paris is also not respected by Eastern Europeans. Perceive it as too willing to negotiate with Moscow over the heads of Warsaw, Prague, Vilnius, and so forth. Farther afield, Italy and Spain appear largely uninterested in a broader leadership role in Europe – perhaps more importantly, they both have their eyes trained on Southerly instability It generates waves of migrants.

Germany’s singular heft notwithstanding, it currently lacks the will to lead. Berlin resists any attempt to get ahead of national or international opinion. Berlin refuses to work without agreement among its allies on international issues. “leading from the middle.” German leaders reflect the domestic scene. Slowly but hesitantly, the world is changing The German electorate is expressing their sentiments.

Berlin also wants the United States to remain at the top of security matters in Europe. After all, Germany lacks a nuclear deterrent of its own, remaining reliant on America’s umbrella. And the albatross of historical guilt remains around Berlin’s neck when it comes to sending military forces or even military equipment anywhere but especially in Eastern Europe. 

All of these have implications for the United States in Europe and beyond. First, it’s clear that for the foreseeable future, Washington will need to lead actively in Europe. Even if war in Ukraine ended tomorrow with a victory for Kyiv, however that’s defined, any subsequent attempt by Washington to pull up stakes in Europe or ‘lead from behind’ It is possible to backfire. To withdraw prematurely from Europe could be dangerous. enduring vital American interests there.

More consequentially, in the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, Washington can’t rely on Europeans to completely ‘backfill’ The United States in Europe. Aside from the lack of will in Germany – the only major European ally with the wherewithal to lead – most major U.S. allies in Europe are either limiting or reducing their military capacity while they Building capabilities is the focus Over the past decade.

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As it has for several generations—and because it has vital interests across two oceans—America will probably need to maintain its leading security role in East Asia and Europe. This role could change in Europe. This could be in the form of a new configuration of U.S. forces stationed in Europe after a Ukrainian victory. The United States will need to remain at the top of the table and lead from the front.

In the Indo-Pacific, the United States will need to maintain and strengthen its ability to project military force and political influence across the Pacific’s vast distances and over time. Washington must continue to place strategic competition with China in the areas of trade, economics, diplomacy and development. Relying Too strongly On A military framing to compete with China risks Being a self-fulfilling prophecy This could lead to overextension, or worse.

Although China remains the primary long-term challenge to American interests and security, it’s equally clear Russia will remain a spoiler in Europe at least through the end of this decade and possibly longer. Moscow’s conflation of security and subservient buffer states is likely to continue running headlong into the West’s vital interest in sovereignty and self-determination. The deal to send tanks to Ukraine should remind Washington that it must continue to exercise leadership in both theaters vital to the American way of life, carefully balancing the resources necessary to do so in each.

John R. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He’s the author of “Coalition of the unWilling and unAble.” His views are his alone.