The federalist

Democrats’ ‘Moneyball’ Tactics Flipped The Hispanic Vote In TX

Texas’ post-midterm story was a Democratic rebound among Hispanic voters driven not by one policy but by data‑driven, targeted campaigning. Democrats-led by David Shor’s Blue Rose and allied analytic groups-spent heavily and used sophisticated testing to re‑engage working‑class and former Democratic Hispanics with tailored ads. Republicans, notably Paxton and Abbott, misread the electorate, lacked resources and effective Hispanic outreach, and failed to counter the microtargeting.The Hispanic swing (around 35% of voters) produced decisive margins that turned close races to Democrats.


A historic shift in the Hispanic vote back toward the Democrats is the key post-midterms story in Texas. This was no accident, nor was it just the consequence of any one policy. It was the result of a remarkable misunderstanding by Republicans and a masterful campaign by Democrats.

Every candidate whose district is bigger than a local town knows that a campaign manager is needed to handle the countless tasks required. Voters know this, too, but few are aware that there has been a growing “Moneyball” moment in the Democratic Party since the early 2000s, with old-guard campaign consultants and their traditional efforts being pushed aside by data scientists who believe they can transform elections and win back voters who have switched sides.

By “Moneyball,” I am referring to the moment in baseball highlighted in the 2011 Brad Pitt hit movie, in which an underfunded team changed its fortunes — and the sport — by bringing data analysis into the clubhouse and building victories despite the resistance of old-guard management and their axioms of how to win.

In the Democratic world, that breakthrough moment happened initially in 2007 when a team of scientists funded by the AFL-CIO, who branded themselves the Analyst Institute, challenged every old-guard Democratic consultant. They argued they had developed a better way to measure what works and that their measurements could create an advantage over Republicans who were unable to conduct the same testing.

There were many skirmishes inside the Democratic campaign world and much resistance to the new scientists, but those researchers mounted the biggest of these “Moneyball” efforts, and achieved by far their greatest victory in Texas this year around the campaign of James Talarico.

It involved many different efforts funded by more money than any Texas Democrat had ever spent, yet it was not quantity that won the race. It was a highly researched and targeted effort to win back voters who had moved away from Democrats, especially in the age of Donald Trump.

The architect of this Texas effort was one of the most eloquent voices in the new data world of Democratic politics: David Shor, the founder of Blue Rose Research. While many Democrats dreamed of turning Texas blue, Shor had the exact team to do it using new testing skills that Democrats have honed over 20 years. He likely knew that Texas could not turn blue simply on the strength of midterm headwinds against Trump and the GOP.

A review of 2026 Federal Election Commission reports for Talarico shows work by Impact Research, Aisle 518 Strategies, Bryson Gillette and Blue Rose Research. All of these are modern data and testing operations without corollaries on the right. Blue Rose is Shor’s group. FEC records and other public reports show he received funding from across the country totaling over $15 million and was possibly the most important voice inside the Talarico effort. That voice was not just in the ears of the Talarico campaign, either. Even the other groups paid by Talarico are friends and colleagues of Shor who worked in close partnership to plan the Talarico and Democratic statewide effort in Texas.

Shor jumped on the Talarico campaign early and certainly knew that a Democratic victory in Texas would require new and better communication than what had been done in recent close losses by Beto O’Rourke and Colin Allred.

In recent years, Shor and other Democrats had expressed concern over — and an understanding of — the massive success Trump achieved among working-class voters, especially Hispanic working-class voters in Texas. Though Talarico would, of course, like any major statewide candidate, also wage a massive air war in broadcast media against Ken Paxton, that alone would not be enough.

It appears from the social media posts of Shor and those around him that they understood they needed to win back the working class. A win in Texas would come from successfully re-engaging former Democratic voters who had moved toward Republicans, especially in the age of Trump.

As I wrote in The Federalist last week, this new methodology leads to a precisely targeted campaign — invisible to the rest of the electorate — where one bloc of voters, or even several different blocs, receives distinct ads that prior testing has shown to be highly persuasive to each particular group. The ads used in such targeted campaigns often differ sharply from those broadcast broadly, because scientists have found they can be blunter and bolder when other voters are not listening. The more aggressive ads are “hidden” from a majority of voters.

Shor was formerly employed by the major firm Civis Analytics before branching off in 2020 to found Blue Rose. Both firms conduct tests developed by Democrats since Barack Obama’s decisive 2012 victory, the very campaign where Shor began his career with these methods.

Shor and these scientists likely saw that Republicans in 2026 were simply not armed with a sufficient understanding of these tools to counter their campaign for Talarico. Paxton had built his career and his 2026 campaign around serving as a warrior for the aggressive Republican activist base, and his campaign staff were entirely unfamiliar with the new science of the left — as is true of nearly every Republican election professional.

It would seem natural to assume Paxton was neither comfortable in the Hispanic community, where Trump had helped move 20 percent of Hispanic-heritage voters toward the Republican Party, nor swayed from his conviction that victory would come from a red-meat campaign against Democrats.

All year, up until the final few weeks before the general election, the Paxton campaign was short of money. This was clear to everyone, and I worried, as I assume Shor and the Democrats assumed, that it would make Paxton’s campaign efforts more anemic. By late summer, the evidence was clear as poll after poll showed not only that Paxton was in trouble, but that Gov. Greg Abbott was too. This was particularly strange because Abbott was outspending the Democratic nominee for governor by more than 10 to 1.

This may be where Shor got luckiest. The Abbott campaign had always raised money with ease and had a strategist at its helm, David Carney, who had run seven straight winning campaigns for statewide office in Texas going back to 1998. Carney had never experienced a loss in Texas, running the gubernatorial campaigns of both Abbott and his predecessor, Rick Perry. In 2012, Carney and his team were profiled in a Democratic book called The Victory Lab for their innovative use of early experimentation borrowed from the left. Even in recent years, through a Republican data effort called Cygnal, Carney claimed to understand big data better than most campaigns.

With Carney at the helm, Abbott should have recognized that he was the only standard-bearer on the right in Texas capable of stopping the Democrats. Instead, the Abbott campaign was simply ineffective at countering Talarico’s messaging.

It remains to be seen exactly what Abbott did wrong, but my own analysis and that of my data scientists lead us to believe that the Abbott team’s two greatest mistakes were:

  • Failing to understand that the race was really against Talarico rather than Abbott’s own underfunded opponent, Gina Hinojosa, and
  • Failing to understand how important the Hispanic vote was or how to appeal to those voters.

Many polls throughout the summer showed that the 20 percent-plus shift toward Republicans among more religious Hispanic voters over the prior decade was experiencing a complete reversal in 2026. Carney certainly saw this and should have known what to do.

After decades of Republicans winning only 25 percent of the Hispanic vote, the Abbott team in its first race in 2014 lifted that share to 44 percent. I was part of that effort, so I know of it firsthand. That 2014 campaign among Texas Democrats of Hispanic descent was a remarkable partnership among data scientists, the anti-abortion community, and Abbott. It centered on a massive Spanish-language campaign crafted through the exact new tests used by Democrats, speaking directly to the faith, family, and motherhood values of many Hispanic women. It was also designed to draw on the cultural pride of many Hispanic Texans who are neither immigrants nor the children of immigrants, and whom Democrats had long taken for granted. It was not based on guesswork or a hunch, but on sophisticated testing.

However, the scientists who executed that 2014 effort were uninvolved with Abbott afterward, and a different team from Washington, D.C., ran this election instead. It is hard to know exactly what they misunderstood, but the simple truth is that the Abbott team did not effectively counter the Talarico effort in Hispanic Texas.

It appears to me that no Republican statewide campaign in Texas in 2026, including Abbott’s, had a viable plan to hold onto the votes of rural Hispanic Texans. If you take a recent convert for granted and do not understand what care that voter needs, you leave the door open for old allies to draw them back.

The math is straightforward. About 35 percent of Texas voters are of Hispanic heritage. That equals 3.5 million votes out of 10 million cast. If 25 percent of that community switches back to the Democrats, that represents a Democratic gain of 875,000 votes and a Republican loss of the same — a swing of 1.75 million votes. Paxton lost by 1.2 million votes, and Abbott lost by 700,000 votes.

It is certainly true that many passionately liberal Democrats were ready to turn out with the same intensity as in 2024, and Republicans would have struggled regardless. Still, the loss of the Hispanic vote is the single largest component of the Texas Republican disaster.

You cannot recover in any election if you fail to hold a massive voting bloc like this. No candidate can. And Republicans who imagine things will simply swing back in 2028 underestimate how much more of this the left will deploy, not less.


Joe Arlinghaus founded a Texas based Republican data and analytics operation, Valor America Election Research. in 2016 after leading an independent campaign among Texas Hispanic voters in the 2014 race for Governor in Texas which saw an 18% shift in the Hispanic vote. He and his team used machine learning and econometric analysis to measure the impact in the 2020 election of the so-called “ZuckBucks” on several swing states won narrowly by Joe Biden. Read more at valoramerica.org.



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