UPDATE: Strange Findings – DHS Investigators Release Report on Secret Service Failures at Butler Assassination Attempt

The article reports on a final report from the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General about Secret Service failures prior to an attempted assassination of then-President Donald Trump on July 13, 2024, in Butler, Pennsylvania. Key findings highlight that a Secret Service site agent in the Pittsburgh area showed inappropriate deference to Trump’s staff and did not adequately address security vulnerabilities, such as failing to block line of sight to the presidential stage from a nearby building where an assailant fired shots. Despite identifying this threat beforehand, the agent’s recommendations were rejected by protectee staff for aesthetic reasons, and the issue was not properly escalated or documented. The report criticizes the Secret Service for not having a fully developed process to document and approve mitigation plans and notes that the responsible agent received only a minor suspension. The agency has since taken some steps to improve, but full reforms remain pending to ensure better security measures in future events.




On Tuesday, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General released its final report on Secret Service failures that preceded the July 13, 2024, assassination attempt against then-former President Donald Trump in Butler, Pennsylvania.

The report featured five key findings, the fifth of which included some strange details.

In short, the Secret Service site agent counterpart — usually a member of state or local law enforcement who coordinates event protection with the lead Secret Service agent, per NBC News — showed inappropriate deference to Trump’s staff on a question of major security-related significance.

Specifically, the report’s fifth key finding blamed the Secret Service for failing to block line of sight to President Trump.

Shortly after 6:00 p.m. on July 13, would-be assassin Thomas Crooks climbed the roof of an American Glass Research International building 155 yards away from Trump and fired eight shots, wounding Trump and killing rally attendee Corey Comperatore.

Prior to the event, the counterpart had identified that building as a threat.

“In Butler, the Secret Service site agent counterpart proposed blocking line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage where President Trump would be speaking,” the report read.

“On July 12, 2024, the site agent counterpart spoke with protectee staff about placing trucks already on location to block the line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage.”

The Trump campaign, however, rejected the counterpart’s suggestion for blocking line of sight.

“The site agent counterpart told us she proposed placing the trucks between the AGR complex and the stage,” the report added, “but protectee staff denied the request because the trucks would be ‘too close to [President Trump’s] press shot.’”

Aesthetic preferences notwithstanding, the Secret Service maintains responsibility for security. And in this instance, according to the report, the counterpart failed.

“The site agent counterpart then proposed moving the trucks to a nearby location instead, which would block line of sight from a different area; protectee staff agreed,” the report continued.

“However, the site agent counterpart did not inform the lead agent or her supervisors that the protectee’s staff rejected her request to place equipment already at the site to block line of sight from the AGR complex to the stage and that the line of sight from the AGR complex would be exposed.”

In other words, the site agent counterpart identified a threat but acquiesced to an inferior consideration. She also failed to follow up on the line-of-sight threat.

“Regardless of whether Secret Service and local law enforcement officers secure a particular area, training still instructs Secret Service members to place objects to block lines of sight, which in this instance included the AGR complex,” the report added two paragraphs later.

According to RealClearPolitics, the site counterpart was Dana DuBrey, “a mid-level agent in the Pittsburgh Field Office.”

DuBrey’s overall negligence, according to Fox News, preceded the on-site threat assessment.

“The Secret Service also said local police ed the senior counterpart their plans to secure the area, but she never opened or read the plans,” the outlet reported.

Documents show that in April 2025, DuBrey received a mere two-week unpaid suspension.

To prevent such failures in the future, the OIG recommended that the Secret Service’s Office of Protective Operations “develop and implement a process to document the identification and blocking of line of sight vulnerabilities and the approval of mitigation plans before events.”

OPO addressed the problem in February 2026, though not to OIG’s full satisfaction.

“Secret Service provided documentation of the process for site agents to document the identification and elimination of line of sight concerns but did not provide evidence of a process for lead agents, supervisors, or others to approve mitigation plans before the event,” the report read. “We will close this recommendation when we receive documentation of the approval process.”

In other words, nearly two years after the Butler assassination attempt, the Secret Service still had not developed a complete plan to prevent a repeat of the site counterpart’s failures.

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