Trump Should Withdraw U.S. Troops From Kosovo
Since NATO’s 1999 bombing of Serbia under Clinton – after promises against eastward expansion were set aside – Kosovo was carved out, provoking Russian anger and leaving KFOR to occupy a troubled, partially recognized state. Roughly 600 U.S. troops remain; teh author argues they should come home. Kosovo’s instability stems from Balkan grievances and wartime legacies, not chiefly from Moscow, and renewed large-scale conflict is unlikely. Europeans and other NATO partners can manage regional security. America is overextended worldwide and should stop micromanaging the Balkans.
In March 1999, President Bill Clinton demonstrated that NATO was not a defensive alliance when he launched his war against Serbia. In doing so, he also showed how little Washington cared about international law when it constrained America’s right to attack another state.
Even more important was the conflict’s impact on Russian politics and Moscow’s relations with the West. Just under two weeks earlier, the U.S. had discarded its commitments to former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin not to expand NATO eastward, adding the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Bombing Yugoslavia, dominated by Serbia, Moscow’s historic friend, angered the Russian public as well as elites.
Nevertheless, the Yeltsin government was unwilling—and unable, given the deterioration in Russian finances and military capabilities—to intervene on Belgrade’s behalf. But it forced its way into Kosovo following the allied takeover and occupation of the province. The U.S. avoided a conflict only because the United Kingdom’s Gen. Michael Jackson rejected the reckless order from Gen. Wesley Clark, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to block the Russian army’s advance. Jackson’s welcome retort: “Sir, I am not starting World War III for you.”
The U.S. and Europe subsequently engaged in a pretend negotiation over Kosovo’s future, with independence preordained. Belgrade balked, however, refusing to agree, and Moscow vetoed United Nations membership, leaving Pristina largely independent but without universal and formal international recognition. Kosovo’s domestic politics remained corrupt, violent, and turbulent, with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) remaining in place to this day. Which means some 600 American military personnel continue to occupy a land of little security interest to America. It is time to bring them home.
Doing so would not require relitigating the decision for war more than a quarter century ago. Yugoslavia was led by the Serbian nationalist Slobodan Milosevic, who ruled ruthlessly and brutally. Ethnic Albanians had a reasonable claim to autonomy if not self-determination, but the growing insurgency, led by the Kosovo Liberation Army, was also ruthless and brutal. Before the Clinton administration decided to adopt that movement’s cause, Ambassador Robert S. Gelbard, Washington’s special envoy, opposed independence and condemned the KLA as “without any questions, a terrorist group.” Kosovo headed toward full-scale war as the U.S.-led West ostentatiously favored the insurgents.
Indeed, at a Rambouillet conference held shortly before the Western attack, Washington demanded that Yugoslavia accept the status of a defeated, occupied nation and allow NATO military units free passage across its territory. Belgrade refused, which was used as a pretext for what the Clinton administration expected to be another “splendid little war,” akin to the Spanish-American War. But the president refused to employ ground troops. Only after a 78-day bombing campaign did Belgrade cede Kosovo—but no allied military forces were ever allowed to traverse Yugoslavia itself beyond the surrendered province.
The new state’s adolescence has been almost as difficult as its war-torn birth. Today, though some 110 nations recognize Kosovo, Serbia remains intransigent, refusing to formally accept the loss of about 15 percent of its territory. One of Kosovo’s presidents, Hashim Thaci, a top war-time KLA leader, was convicted of war crimes and obstruction of justice before an international tribunal at the Hague earlier this year. The country has just emerged from a lengthy political impasse, and stable governance likely remains beyond reach, at least in the foreseeable future.
Yet American troops remain on station—27 years after the Yugoslav civil war and 81 years after the Second World War. Whatever arguments favored America’s defending the continent of Europe in 1945 and the territory of Kosovo in 1999 no longer apply in 2026. Despite continuing verbal fisticuffs between Kosovar and Serbian politicians, Belgrade is unlikely to use force, especially after the dramatic election defeat of Serbia’s nationalist President Aleksandar Vucic, who was booted from office earlier this year. The personnel and policies in the new government remain in flux, but a resumption of the Balkan wars is highly unlikely.
However, the U.S. commitment to Kosovo, along with NATO members, South Korea, Japan, Israel, and a multitude of secondary states, remains sacrosanct to some. The U.S. is stuck in another endless Mideast war, fighting a dangerous proxy battle against Russia, and preparing for conflict against China over Taiwan, but no matter: Kosovo is at risk!
Writing last week in Defense One, Mark Montgomery and Ivana Stradner of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies contend:
As the Pentagon finalizes its review of U.S. force posture in Europe, one relatively small commitment deserves protection from the budget axe: the roughly 600 American troops serving in NATO’s Kosovo Force. They barely register in a debate about brigades and billion-dollar line items, but they keep a hard-won peace in the Balkans, and pulling them out would save almost nothing while handing Moscow a cheap strategic win.
Yet Kosovo’s present travails and Serbia’s determined intransigence have nothing to do with Russia. Montgomery and Stradner argue,
Even while absorbing heavy losses in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has not given up on destabilizing Europe. The Balkans, Europe’s soft underbelly, are a favored arena: cheap to stir, a place to distract Western attention from Ukraine. Moscow has long used Serbia as a lever against Kosovo’s stability.
Yet Russia is largely irrelevant to Kosovo’s permutations. The disintegration of the polyglot nation of Yugoslavia, Serbian determination to retain contested lands, Kosovar struggle for autonomy, and Serbian refusal to accept dismantlement by allied forces all reflect indigenous Balkan fault lines. Moscow offers Belgrade mere diplomatic assistance and little more—certainly no military support for conflict.
As for the fear that a U.S. drawdown would “embolden nationalist agendas in Kosovo and Serbia as well as separatist ambitions in Republika Srpska, the Serb-dominated region in nearby Bosnia,” such passions exist and flourish because they have never been addressed with even the pretense of fairness and justice. Allied policy in the Balkans can be summed up simply: The Serbs always lose. While Serbian ethnic cleansing within Yugoslavia, so often murderous and expansive, was rightly decried, Croatian ethnic cleansing, ruthless and brutal in the Krajina region, was effectively supported by the West, and Kosovar ethnic cleansing, also cruel and unsparing, was readily accepted.
The best way to end persistent ethnic tensions would be to address them, not keep America entangled in struggles not its own. Oddly, those most enamored of international social engineering profess themselves to be horrified at the idea of allowing ethnic Serbs to change borders. This after the U.S. and its European allies enthusiastically dismantled nations, established new ones, and redrew old boundaries, all the while expecting those most affected to willingly submit.
In any case, given the low chances of war, there isn’t even a theoretical need for America. If Europe is really worried about the potential for conflict, other NATO members are more than capable of keeping the peace. It is ridiculous for other peoples to expect Washington to always be on station everywhere forever. To paraphrase Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk, why should 500 million Europeans expect 345 million Americans to defend them from 145 million Russians? Especially when those 345 million Americans, whose government is effectively bankrupt, are also expected to defend Australia, Bahrain, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and other dependencies.
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Moreover, though the deployment is small, the Balkans commitment is not without danger. Although the risk remains minimal, Kosovo could become another dangerous flashpoint with Moscow. Washington and European governments already are using Ukraine as a convenient military battering ram, providing intelligence, battle plans, weapons, and money to kill tens of thousands of Russians. The U.S. would not stand supinely by if Moscow were similarly aiding, say, Mexico against America. Indeed, Russia apparently has assisted Iran and directly retaliated against several European states. With Kiev under increasing pressure and, some observers fear, headed toward national defeat and regime failure, Ukraine and its European allies could resort to more desperate measures, spreading more international kindling.
As Germany’s famed Iron Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, apocryphally observed before the First World War, “The Balkans aren’t worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” It is up to Berlin to judge the region’s value to Germany today. But the region certainly isn’t worth the bones of a single American, whatever his or her combat specialty.
After decades of attempting to micromanage the globe, Uncle Sam should step back. What happens in the Balkans matters little to America. It is well past time for Washington to leave the people there to settle their own affairs.
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