The Ukraine War Shows How Urban Combat Is Changing

What does urban warfare in Ukraine look like, with its adversaries being relatively balanced nation-states?

It is useful to start with a list of urban warfare’s unique features and challenges, such as the one I produced in a 2019 study on urban warfare in strategic competition. In this study, a review of joint/allied doctrine, subject-matter expert discussions, historical case studies, and hypothetical vignettes suggested that most of the features and challenges present in historical battles are likely to be intensified in great power competition (today’s “strategic competition”). The potential for four new features or challenges in strategic competition will also be present.

In Ukraine, we have indeed seen all eight characteristics and challenges of historic urban warfare as identified in the 2019 study. The physical terrain of cities has encapsulated both Russian and Ukrainian forces. Lang Urban combat has a distinctive feature. Urban combat is characterized by high-rise buildings that have dictated what weapons and equipment can be used. This has required decentralization. Command and control. and generated casualties. Other seven characteristics and challenges of historical urban warfare exist as well, including the need to decentralize and act quickly. decision-making under uncertainty; challenges Information management ISR that works, Targeting Medical care and expeditionary logistics; and elements “Three-Block War” Intensive and stressful, and high-manpower Operation. 

In Ukraine, the four postulated new features and challenges to urban warfare in strategic rivalry have been also observed. 

First, it is difficult to reach the urban areas of operations. Unlike the United States’ experience with relatively permissive urban environments in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past twenty-plus years of counterinsurgency operations and even Azerbaijan’s experience in the Fighting for Shusha in 2020Russia Has We struggled tremendously To gain entry Ukraine’s urban areas. The unexpected losses suffered by Russian forces are shocking. They resorted to using siege tactics In One city after another This has been reflected in Ukraine. 

The second is that the urban battles featured multiple contested domains. air, LandAnd subterranean. This contrasts with prominent historical examples like Fallujah 2004 and more recent episodes Mosul Shusha, where the majority of combat was concentrated in the land realm. 

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Third, urban battles have seen a greater mix of irregular and regular forces in Ukraine with better capabilities than in previous decades. Russia has used regular troops. conscripts, Proxy forcesMercenaries such as the Wagner GroupAnd even more Syrians  To conduct operations in urban areas Little Regard For civilian lives and infrastructure. It has resulted in high levels of casualties as well as destruction. From the U.S. military’s perspective, future urban warfare can be expected to contrast with its urban fights over the past twenty years, in which opposing forces largely used irregular tactics and had lower-level capabilities (e.g., small arms and light weapons). It is possible to expect urban warfare in strategic conflict to include adversaries (like Russia) that employ less restrictive rules of engagement than U.S. forces.

Finally, the electronic spectrum was also contested in MosulUkraine is the first instance of real international cooperation. Both Sides The spectrum is under threat from all sides. urban combat, using jamming to challenge the other side’s communications and its operation of equipment like drones. 

These findings provide three key lessons for U.S. planners and defense policymakers. First, urban warfare will still play a major role in armed conflict (including when national-states clash), so policymakers and planners need to keep this in mind as they prepare for military operations. Military analysts and observers of the operations in Ukraine should focus on deriving lessons from urban warfare,  particularly concerning the implications of the four new features and challenges. 

Second, much is the doctrine that underpins urban operations for U.S. Army & Marine Corps. Older And has Not updated It should reflect the modern operating environment and adversary capabilities. These services should consider revising this key doctrine in order to reflect the events in Ukraine. 

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps, along with other American allies, must train for urban operations in two-story Sandstone. “MOUT towns” They are situated in the middle nowhere, trying to imitate South Asian/Middle Eastern cities and villages. Instead, they should be able to practice realistic urban training by going into real cities for exercises and training. Like the 31st MEU did recently in Oahu. Only then can they get an approximation of what Russian and Ukrainian forces are experiencing in Ukraine’s cities and truly be as prepared as possible for the likely city fight to come in the future against adversaries.

Dr. Sam Plapinger, a Research Scientist at CNA in Arlington, Virginia, is a nonpartisan, nonpartisan research organization. He was the embedded CNA field representative for the U.S. commander from 2020-2022. He was the embedded CNA field representative to the commander of U.S. Navy Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet, Bahrain. This involved conducting research and analysis on the ground for the U.S. Navy Commander in the Middle East. His work at CNA was focused on the Middle East’s security and strategic competition. The author’s views do not necessarily reflect those of CNA, its sponsors or their official positions.