The Iran War Is Uniting the Muslim World

The GOP’s midterm elections rout last week transformed U.S. politics. And the Iran War had a lot to do with it. Vice President J.D. Vance, in a social media post, placed it first on a short list of reasons why Trump supporters defected to the Democrats. Donald Trump, Jr., the president’s son and an influential MAGA voice, cosigned the VP’s diagnosis. Even President Donald Trump, to the surprise of many, has echoed Vance’s comments.

The war’s political consequences could also reshape Trump’s cabinet. The president has reportedly been asking advisors whether Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth should keep his job. Despite public denials, NBC reported last week that Trump was considering replacing Hegseth.

But as seismic as the war’s reshaping of the domestic political landscape has proved, its most transformative effects may be felt abroad. In the Persian Gulf region and the wider Muslim world, the security architecture is shifting. It had been built on the isolation of Iran in exchange for protection from America, but both parts of that foundation are now cracking. Though the Gulf nations are unlikely to totally abandon their security relationship with the United States, they are turning toward each other—and crucially, they are reengaging Iran.

Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain, which host bases that enable the U.S. military’s forward presence in the Middle East, are frustrated by their current relationship with Washington. Throughout the Iran War, they have felt abandoned by a U.S. president who has ignored their warnings and sidelined their interests. And they have watched as the bases that were meant to provide protection instead invited attack, turning their hosts into targets of Iran’s military retaliation. 

These developments have led to a rethinking of the region’s security architecture. Gulf leaders have begun talking to each other about developing a unified stance on regional security.

The first fruit of those talks was the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Article 2 of the new pact, similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision, states that “an externally originating armed attack against any of the ‘Parties’ shall be considered an attack against all the ‘Parties’.” In the first trigger of that article, Pakistan sent troops and fighter jets to help Saudi Arabia in its fight against the Yemeni Houthis.

Egypt, though not a member of the joint defense agreement, has also emphasized its commitment to regional security, and is reportedly considering joining the pact. It too recently authorized defensive military assistance to Saudi Arabia. Syria has also begun exploring possible membership in the Mecca alliance.

This process of integration may even spread to encompass Muslim-majority nations outside of the region. In October, Pakistan, Turkey, and Qatar signed an agreement with Indonesia to enhance defense industry cooperation. While not a Mecca-style joint defense agreement, the Badr Memorandum, according to the Qatari Defense Ministry, “aims to foster cooperation in the field of defence manufacturing [and] enhance defence capabilities among the four countries.” A Turkish Defense Ministry statement says the agreement comes out of the desire to “deepen cooperation and develop partnerships.”

But perhaps the most transformative shift in the geopolitical landscape is the emergence of a security architecture that is no longer based on Iran’s isolation, but rather its inclusion. Last year, Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi had already pushed back against the framing of Iran as the driver of insecurity in the region and called for a shift to engagement with Tehran and an “inclusive dialogue.”

Al-Busaidi recently renewed that appeal, saying that the American portrait of Iran as the chief threat to regional security has been “the most damaging of the priorities imposed on the region from the outside.” He said that constructing a security system on that “entirely false perception” had led to an “unstable” region. He even called on the Gulf states, Iraq, and Iran to unite in a “non-aggression” security pact.

And the Middle East has now taken what may be the first small steps toward that new security architecture. At the end of October, Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistani chief of the armed forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Turkish intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin went to Tehran for talks with Iranian officials including Mohsen Rezaei, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also attended.

The packed agenda included opening a channel to deescalate military tensions. But it went beyond that. The broader aim, according to a senior Pakistani security official, was to build “a regional non-aggression network.” And a joint statement released at the end of the meeting promised “to continue the dialogue to strengthen cooperation amongst the four regional countries, including for peace and security in the region.”

The Iran War has brought a seismic change to American politics. But it may bring an even greater transformation to the geopolitics of the Gulf region and the wider Muslim world. America will continue to play a role in the Middle East. But the Gulf Arab states, Turkey, Pakistan, and others are showing signs of turning away from the United States, toward each other, and in favor—remarkably—of productive engagement with Iran.