North Korea’s Growing ICBM Threat: How America and South Korea Should Respond

The Increasing Threat of North Korean ICBMs will exacerbate Allied Concerns In a recent military parade, Pyongyang It has produced the most number of multi-warhead ICBMs ever Displayed Unveiled at the same time New solid-fueled ICBM. North Korea’s steadily expanding long-range missile arsenal There is a risk of overwhelming the few ground-based interceptors protecting the American homeland. This will increase the concern among allies that Washington, faced with a credible threat of nuclear attack from the regime, might not be able to defend against North Korean aggression.

North Korea’s New ICBMs

A parade to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the United States on February 8,^Th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army, Pyongyang revealed at least 11 Hwasong-17 missiles, the world’s largest road-mobile ICBM. Experts believe that the missile could carry three to four nuclear warheads, having been successfully tested in flight in November 2022. This number of multiple-warhead missiles, along with North Korea’s other ICBMs, could inundate the 44 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska and California. According to U.S. officials, they plan to fire multiple interceptors, upto four at any one incoming warhead.

North Korea also showed a new containerized ballistic missile. It is believed to be the prototype for a solid-fuel ICBM. Kim Jong-un During a January 2021 speech. Pyongyang successfully tested a solid-fuel rocket engine last December 2022.http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/5423e068147b92829b052588227b402d.kcmsf”>announced It had a thrust of 140 tonnes of force, more than any other vehicle. U.S., Russian or Chinese ICBM. Solid-fueled missiles take less time to launch and are therefore easier to spot and target.

North Korea’s ability to hold numerous American cities at risk of attack by hydrogen bombs has aggravated allies’ doubts about U.S. capability, resolve, and willingness to defend their countries. South Koreans are questioning the strength of the U.S. extended defense guarantee and wondering if the U.S. would ever be able to match it. “willing to trade San Francisco for Seoul” Oder if it would abandon its ally.

Current and former South Korean officials privately express concern that the 2024 U.S. presidential election could lead to an isolationist administration that downgrades America’s alliance commitments, perceives the military relationship in transactional terms, and threatens to reduce or remove U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula while unilaterally terminating combined military exercises and rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets.

In January 2023 President Yoon Suk Yeol Numerous nuclear-related statements Yoon made were inconsistent with his previous positions, U.S. foreign policy and ongoing bilateral talks. Yoon seemed to mock U.S. extended defense. “the U.S. telling us not to worry because it will take care of everything. But now, it’s difficult to convince our people with just that.”

Yoon suggested that South Korea might construct its own nuclear weapons if the North Korean threat gets worse. Your nuclear weapons. The Administraton subsequently walked back Yoon’s comments, but that did not quell widespread media speculation of shifts in South Korean policy. 

South Korean polls reveal high (over) satisfaction. 70%) public support for an indigenous nuclear weapons program. Only 51 percent A majority of Koreans polled in 2022 believed that the United States would use extended deterrence in order to defend Seoul against hostilities in the Korean Peninsula.

Washington has taken steps in order to address South Korean concerns regarding the strength of the U.S. Extended Deterrence Guarantee. For the first time in four year, the U.S. began large-scale joint military exercises and rotational deployments of nuclear-capable assets to the Korean Peninsula. This included the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carriers and B52 bombers. Washington Further enhancements are promised These deployments should be done quickly, efficiently, and in a regular manner.

Lloyd Austin, Secretary for Defense, and Lee Jongsup Minister of National Defense have vowed to Further strengthening the alliance’s military capabilities and readiness through information sharing, training, exercises, and consultation, as well as joint planning and execution, to deter and respond to North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile threats.

Two table-top exercises will be conducted by the U.S.A. and South Korea to simulate North Korean behavior Nuclear weapons U.S. strategy for nuclear assets and strategic asset responses to North Korean threats, imminent nuclear attacks, and other scenarios of nuclear attack.

These and other measures are not enough to address South Korean concerns. Washington must develop a comprehensive strategy that includes pragmatic nuclear policies, better nuclear coordination with its allies and robust military capabilities. It also needs to communicate its resolve to allies and opponents.

What’s Next

Washington should determine what additional measures might increase reassurance by pressing South Korea for specific recommendations. Seoul has not yet provided concrete measures to address its concerns.

South Korea and the United States should establish a bilateral mechanism to coordinate extended deterrence policies. This includes nuclear planning, options and contingencies as well as combined exercises and the deployment of U.S. military assets. For South Korea to be included in U.S. crisis decision-making relating to possible use of nuclear weapons, it is important that procedures are established.

While the U.S. could designate and empower an existing bilateral group as a nuclear consultative group, it seems that South Korea would perceive anything less than creating a new body with the Nuclear Planning Group moniker — commensurate with the existing NATO entity — to be insufficient.

The divergence between the U.S. and South Korea on extended deterrence mars what had been a near total alignment of policies following Yoon Suk Yeol’s inauguration. U.S. officials in Washington and Korea watchers in Washington welcomed the South Korean government’s change since Yoon introduced pragmatic thinking about foreign and security policy.

Both sides must manage the nuclear issue with deftness. The U.S. must be proactive in its trust-building efforts to soothe South Korean fears. South Korea needs to respond to public expectations and show them what is possible. President Yoon will be under greater pressure if North Korea continues to engage in provocative acts.

The nuclear dispute could lead to tension in the alliance if it is not dealt with well by both countries. This comes at a moment when the two countries, together with their allies and partners in Indo-Pacific, must be working closely together in order to resolve the North Korean crisis. Chinese threats. 

World-Class Experience, Expertise, and Author Expertise 

Now, a 19FortyFive Contributing editor Bruce Klingner is a senior research fellow specializing in Korean and Japanese affairs at The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. From 1996 to 2001, Klingner was CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea, responsible for analyzing political, military, economic, and leadership issues for the president of the United States and other senior U.S. policymakers. In 1993-1994, he was the chief of the CIA’s Korea branch, which analyzed military developments during a nuclear crisis with North Korea.