Biden Requires a Fresh Ukraine War Plan Immediately.

Is Ukraine’s Offensive a Lost Cause?

The Background

Last December, Russia’s government and media were abuzz with claims of a massive Russian winter offensive. Western intelligence sources were also convinced that an attack was imminent. However, either the Russians chose to withhold their striking power or they frittered it away piecemeal along the 1,000-km front. In more recent months, the Ukrainian side is the one hinting at a major looming counteroffensive. But if Ukraine does launch an attack, it is just as unlikely to produce any breakthroughs.

The Problem

In the coming months, this conflict is likely to either sink into an indeterminate stalemate or continue as a war of attrition. Regardless of which way the conflict tilts, however, America’s current policy will not produce a beneficial outcome for the United States. For the good of our national interest and our country itself, Washington must quickly adjust to emerging realities and shape a new strategy that has a reasonable chance of success.

The Risks

American military officials privately warn that if Ukraine does launch an offensive this spring or early summer, Kyiv will incur significant risk. Though the frontlines have moved little since last October, both sides have suffered egregious numbers of casualties in static frontline battles, especially in Vuledar, Soledar, and most infamously, in Bakhmut. For almost two months, Ukraine has diverted reserves to Bakhmut that were originally intended for its spring offensive. They have been successful in preventing full Russian capture of the town, but at the cost of weakening Kyiv’s offensive striking power.

The Solution

Finding a Path to Peace Any territory Ukraine captures in its offensive will be very expensive in manpower and equipment lost. It has taken the better part of a year for the West to provide the thousands of combat vehicles, millions of rounds of artillery and small arms ammunition, and air defense launchers and rockets. It has likewise taken many months to provide even the limited training it has given the UAF. Once this offensive is completed, it could take another six months to a year to rebuild that level of striking power again, and that assumes the West will be able to provide more than 1,000 additional armored vehicles and millions of rounds of ammo.

The Reality

Russia has millions more men than Ukraine from which to draw for future mobilizations. Its military industrial complex is well on its way to achieving large-scale wartime production of arms and munitions. Given these conditions, there is no reasonable path in the near or medium term for Ukraine to accomplish its objective: the expulsion of Russian troops from Ukraine’s 1991 borders.

The most likely outcome of Ukraine’s offensive will be an inconclusive stalemate. If the war simply degrades into a conflict of attrition, it could go on for years. America’s stated policy of giving Ukraine what it needs “for as long as it takes” is not sustainable as a strategy and almost certainly will not produce an outcome beneficial to either the United States or Ukraine. A course correction is therefore required.

The Solution

Given our actions over the past 14 months, there is no change that would be easy, desirable, or palatable. Unless we want to deepen our failure, however, change is nevertheless compulsory.

It is clear that many in Europe already recognize that Ukraine cannot win the war in a practical time frame at a reasonable cost. Poland and the Baltics appear to be stalwart in their desire to continue all actions to help Ukraine fight Russia, but much of the rest of Europe would likely support a move to find a negotiated settlement. The U.S. should take the diplomatic initiative by first privately conferring with Kyiv and Brussels — as well as Moscow — to begin the process of finding a settlement.

The Conclusion

As horrible as it would be for us to accept ending the war on undesirable terms, it would be even worse to ignore reality and continue pursuing an unattainable military objective. The cost for the former is unpleasant. The cost to the latter could be infinitely worse.