American Defense Priorities After Ukraine War
Russia’s war against Ukraine has peeled back the veneer and revealed the rot within Moscow’s military machine. Kyiv’s impressive battlefield successes Russia suffered major losses in terms of territory and manpower as well as materiel. The tide has now turned in favor of Russia. brutal war of attrition. Russia’s gains are being reversed ever so slowly and at significant cost to all sides. Ukraine is not yet victorious, however. still has far to go In terms of regaining its territory control as winter approaches. There are many options. variety of scenarios Information about the end of war and when it will be over. Based on the counteroffensives from this past fall, one should feel that everything is in order. more optimistic than some senior U.S. military officials are about Ukraine’s prospects for greater success early next year.
Although the war will go on into next year and possibly beyond, it is time that we start to consider longer-term implications of modern warfare in Europe. It is not too soon to draw inferences as to how the age will unfold. character of warfare is changing. How can NATO and the United States adapt to best ensure Europe’s stability and advance U.S. interests?
Answering this question raises two important issues. First, there is the ongoing debate over how technological shifts can impact the balance of defense and offense. This debate has obvious implications for force structures across the West that should inform NATO’s security posture and investments. The second issue concerns the balance of power in Europe, and how NATO and America should be positioned to ensure stability. The implications of these shifts argue against increases in heavy tanks for the U.S. force structure and favor a posture along NATO’s frontier that is defensively oriented. This “hedgehog” approach is part of NATO’s past. It is dangerous to adopt an offensive strategy that doesn’t take into account the changing nature and character of warfare. This could be counterproductive to regional stability as well as U.S. strategic priorities. These are at greater risk in Asia.
Be defensive “Dominance”
Many military scholars have been my friend. David JohnsonYou can read more about it here. emerging technologies have made the defense dominant Complex offensive maneuver. This issue is of strategic importance and should be highlighted. It should also influence budgetary allocations and defense strategy beyond Europe. As T. X. Hammes put it:
Investing in The wrong side of the competition is a rich nation’s game that the United States may no longer be able to afford. Strategic defeat could be possible if misdirected investment is made against peer competition on scale.
This question should guide the development of force and overseas positions as part national security discussions.
What does it actually mean when a new technology is said to have an offensive or defensive advantage that leads to dominance? This clarification will be helpful to those who are not familiar with it. longstanding theory and its critics. The offense-defense balance is the more popular term in literature. It refers to military technology favoring one over the other. The balance favoring defense is due to technological developments like the machine gun or rifled musket, so wars are less likely. As Robert Jervis said, the offense should be dominant. “it is easier to destroy the other’s army and take its territory than it is to defend one’s own.”
Is it useful to think in terms of defensive and offensive advantages in the current state of military technology? Some scholars believe there is. limited utility in categorizing Weapons may be offensive or defensive. Some weapons, like the tank can aid either an offensive campaign of a defensive mode. You can easily see swarming drones being used as either offensive systems to destroy an integrated defense system or as lethal defense against an armoured force that is threatening friendly forces.
Second, “dominance” This term may not be appropriate to describe the constantly changing nature of warfare or the constant interaction between technology and human creativity that is a part of war. You might be more comfortable thinking of offensive and defense superiority as a continuum. Instead, think about how technological changes affect the balance. There are technological innovations, such as armed drones, that can allow for a true dominant position in offensive and defensive operations. Dominance would be the extreme of the continuum. There are arguably very few instances. The state of ballistic-missile defense would make nuclear weapons the most prominent example of offensive dominance.
It is unclear how emerging technologies will impact each domain. Third, we don’t know if force planners and policy makers can use the current state in military technology to generalize across all domains. “defense dominant.” Space seems to favor offense, since satellites can be easily tracked and are fragile. Both Russia and China are both focusing on this topic counterspace capabilities These reflect this trend. Some cyber strategists question the idea of defensive dominance in the cyber realm entirely. Other technologies include artificial intelligenceAlthough they could provide decisive advantages in the domain, it is not clear if they would only be beneficial for defensive operations.
It is important to remember that military technology must be applied within a specific context. Black and white distinctions can be counterproductive. It is clear that the widespread availability and relative low cost surveillance and targeting technologies will be in our favor. fires and attrition over maneuver In the near future. This would support defensive dominance thinking. However, the maneuver-attrition debate is not a binary decision. Both defense and offense require a combination of movement and firepower.
Technology is changing conflict’s nature and gives the defense an advantage in many situations. In ground warfare, there is a shift in favor the defender at the moment, just like in Helmuth von. Moltke the Elder When you are firepower revolution The late 19th century made maneuvering and mass formations impossible. The technologies that underpin the current revolution will have similar impact. They are not only offered by America, but also by smaller countries like Canada. Turkey And Israel. But, wise planners know that there will always be countermeasures. A continuous cycle of action and reaction Over time, each domain will have a different offense-defense balance.
Europe’s Balance of Power
The second issue that requires reflection is the balance of power in Europe vis-à-vis Russia and NATO’s capacity for collective defense. While it would be a mistake to ignore Russia’s reckless leadership and its ingrained sense of grievance, overestimating its combat power and ability to reconstitute itself is not appropriate either.
In economic terms, the European Union’s gross domestic product is 10 times Russia. This gap will only get wider. Russian economy is on the brink of ruin It struggles to sustain its military effort, and it is losing its recovery could last a decade Or beyond. Demographically, Europe’s population is over three times the size of Russia’s. Moscow’s human capital is in declineThe war has diminished the chances of restoration, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Assessments of Russia’s demographic decline focus too much on population size You should avoid asking difficult questions about the quality human capital (e.g. health care, education etc.).).
Moscow’s limitations include available resources for defense. NATO is the best NATO, no matter how you define it. outspends Russia on defense. Moscow excels at converting its resources to effective weapons. However, the Russian military remains a formidable force. not designed for sustained offensive operations or in the ongoing war of attrition it has been involved in. According to the U.S. government, Moscow has suffered grievous losses. 100,000 Russian troops killed or wounded in Ukraine. Independent sources document Russian losses 1,420 tanks, 2,314 armoured and infantry fighting vehicle, and 262 aircraft. Russia is now required to issue obsolete legacy weapons, conduct audits and to issue new weapons. “stealth mobilization” It will also help to cover its losses. Sources in Europe estimate that Russia has used 80 percent of its missile stock and is improvising with aged nuclear missile components to replenish its weapons stock.
Moscow faces a difficult task in generating new combat power and forces. Russia is no longer able to use its military might. 30-year-old chips from Texas Instruments Its operations can be sustained. Any country who is forced to steal computer chips from refrigerators and dishwashers It is both adaptable and desperate. Moscow will suffer further economic and military-related destruction from the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions are not magic weaponsThey are costly and delay a Russian reconstitution. Moscow will find workarounds. It is already looking for Iran for missiles and drones And to North Korea for ammunition. It is unclear if China will come to Russia’s aid in terms of military supply.
The combination of an improved position of relative combat power vis-à-vis Russia, and Moscow’s limited ability to reconstitute its forces, suggests that NATO will remain in a strong position in the short to medium term. Adding to the ledger are the contributions that Sweden and Finland bring to enhance NATO’s capacity and bolster deterrence and European stability. As NATO consolidates accession of Finland and Sweden in the alliance, and if Germany the “sleeping giant,” If the alliance can achieve its security transformation promises, it will maintain a favorable balance in power. Germany is still a major power. “if” In my mind.
Assessment
Overall, Russia is perceived as less of a threat today than they are. This is the conclusion. “the threat from Russia has returned to Cold War levels” Does not stand. Russia’s overall military power is now a shadow of the Soviet threat of 1970s and has suffered significant degrading in the past nine months. As Jack Watling has observed, Russia’s poor performance The obvious shortfalls in Ukraine go beyond mere materiel shortages. Russia still has a significant force and can use selected military capabilities (i.e. long-range strike and integrated air defense) that cannot be ignored. However, its combat power is likely to decrease in the future. Russian attempts to rebuild its military power are unsuccessful. “doomed to failure,” But it will be a difficult climb.
This is a strong argument against any significant increase in U.S. forces presence on the continent. The Biden administration’s current policy of modest and temporary increases in U.S. military presence will be a strong signal of American support for the alliance. Many Europeans are skeptical about America’s ability to stay in power after the election. Trump-era bashing of NATOIt is temporary and prudent. But research surveys This could also lead to Europeans feeling more vulnerable as a result of U.S. force levels. There are also other gaps that are more urgent and harder to fund. It is worth considering the opportunity costs of increasing force levels at cost of other missions in Asia. All of this augurs against calls for significant increases in permanent U.S. armor formations on NATO’s frontier.
However, Western observers need to be careful. hubristic assessments about Russia’s powers of reconstitution. Moscow may not be a full-spectrum superpower but it has its geopolitical tools, and is willing to take risks. A Center for a New American Security report shows that Russia has a great deal of potential. sizable but not agile industrial base to rebuild its military power. It will have to face difficulties in acquiring technology from the West, unless it uses indirect means such as from Iran to help build drones.
Russia will continue to be dangerous even in decline During the next decade, and keep many tools to undermine European stability. It is not dead, but it is still a threat to the West.
Overall, Russia has many systemic advantages that the West has over Russia. These include demographics and education. Military staff expertise in complex operations. Advanced military technology. Access to capital. There is also a relative lack corruption. Russia’s economic potential is severely constrainedHowever, it has not yet (sorry for any pun) tanked. Consider the stark scale of its losses and evident internal decay, whatever resources Russia will have to invest will be needed to repair its present inventory, restock a depleted supply of munitions, and recruit tomorrow’s armed forces. Russia’s defense industry will be severely hampered Sanctions and the loss of intellectual and fiscal capital. Its ambitious plans are for fifth-generation fighters, and peer-level. combat aviation procurement It is expected that these will be delayed until the country regains its missile production capability and inventory. This is unlikely to happen in this decade. Nor will Beijing offset Moscow’s manifest deficiencies in operational planning, manpower, and personnel development. As suggested by ten authors writing for the NATO Defense CollegeThere are no possible scenarios where the Russian economy will not be negatively affected by the conflict against Ukraine, regardless of the outcome.
While advocating for a strengthened NATO defense posture, Michael O’Hanlon has come to the same conclusion:
The Russian military’s limitations have been demonstrated by the conflict in Ukraine 2022. It has actually significantly reduced the strength of the Russian armed forces. With export controls and sanctions likely to continue for some time, this reality is likely not to change.
As Stephen Kotkin has noted, Russia’s aspirations vis-à-vis the West routinely outrun its capabilities. This cycle of “weakness and grandeur” It is happening again. Reconstituting its forces back to their 2020 level is going to take up much of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s attention and budget over the rest of this decade, even though President Vladimir Putin has promised that there will be “no limitations” On military spending. Bringing its forces up to NATO’s level in qualitative terms may be near impossible when non-materiel elements are factored in. It is Russian weakness juxtaposed against Putin’s recklessness with the military power he has that makes Russia dangerous. Russia will not be weakened. persistent problem.
This should be taken into consideration when adapting for U.S. outposts in Europe. These outposts serve as a prerequisite for American power projection, reassurance, and deterrence. This does not support the conclusion reached by a recent paper, which argued that U.S. forward-deployed troops in the Middle East or Indo-Pacific should remain at their current levels and that America’s European posture should be maintained. “increase and expand eastward.” This conclusion ignores the fact that Europe is strong in NATO and Asia. This doesn’t mean Europe shouldn’t be left to fend for itself. It is hard to imagine an instance of Russian military aggression against NATO allies that didn’t involve U.S. forces on the battlefield.
Europe can and must be more competitive in military modernization and its readiness. NATO’s performance is still far below the standards. 2014 Wales Summit Standards for budgeting levels (2%) and modernization (20%) of the defense budget. It is imperative that the alliance quickly operationalize its plans. Strategic Concept Smart investments should be made in command and control, air and ground-delivered munitions, and logistics for sustained conflict.
It is instructive to see the large use of guided weapons in Ukraine, which includes rocket and missile artillery. A combination of deep strike systems and pervasive surveillance affords a vantage point. defensive but operationally relevant advantage NATO’s defensive strategy should revolve around this. Similar lessons must be learned with respect to mobile surface to air systems in order to meet. air defense requirements Russia of the use of its fighter-bomber, helicopter and other assets.
Buy enhanced (mobile) air defences, aerial drones and tactical attack missiles Hammes) is a smart procurement priority. People saw the age of before this conflict. smart loitering munitions coming. Contemporary conflict has reinforced the need for more precision and standoff, as well as increased drone use and loitering munitions. fewer manned helicopters. The drone competition has lower entry requirements, as you can see in these pages. “make cheap but effective robotic airpower available to a much broader range of states.” However, drones and loitering munitions are making combined arms more efficient. It isn’t clear if they will ever be effective. have revolutionized warfare. As expected, the race to counter-drone capabilities continues. This could overshadow the apparent benefits offered by unmanned systems that are more agile. I am betting on their continued growth in numbers and at a lower cost than existing systems.
It would be reasonable to have a prioritized program both for the United States and Europe. substantial investment As a first order, you will need to have both land force ammunition as well as precision-guided weapons stocks. This includes aviation ordnance. The conflict in Ukraine is a reminder that protagonists need to expect nearly the same. insatiable consumption rates. Sir Lawrence Freedman is the one who has rated it:
A huge lesson from the war Because of the modern warfare in Ukraine, you can go through materials and supplies quickly. Stockpiles never last long. NATO countries have severely depleted their resources supporting Ukraine.
The U.S. Army appears to understand this priority and is currently seeking to double or triple production Several of these weapons. NATO countries, including the United States have limited industrial capacity. They need to rebuild their inventories, and rethink the risks involved. limited production capacity To offset large-scale attrition. Moscow may be deterred if they move away from tripwire forces and instead use more powerful munition stocks. At the moment, there are no plans to change. “arsenal of democracy” Will have empty shelves for some time.
The evidence of combat operations in Ukraine is a strong argument for the existence of systems such as the JavelinThe Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (more commonly called the NLAW), and the Switchblade 600 These factors are worth considering in the discussion about more efficient investment strategies. One Western tank is possible to buy. 10 launchers and 100 missiles. The lifecycle costs of the tank — training, equipment transport, refuelers, and maintenance — compound this comparison much further. NATO should try to impose these costs on adversaries and not itself.
These weapon systems will become increasingly common, and they are widely used around the world. Israelis are home to a variety of anti-tank weapons systems. Spike systemThe Javelin’s cheaper alternative, the, is being exported as an affordable option and has already been sold to many countries. The Chinese have the HJ-12 anti-tank guided missileThe Javelin-like design of the XL1 is closely copied. It also comes with air-launched options. These systems will continue to grow.
These systems will change the way that Western maneuvers and armor systems are used. While tanks are not a common weapon, not completely obsoleteThey are also more vulnerable to anti-tank weapons, both from the air and the ground. These systems are more maneuverable, lethal, and range than the previous generation. These systems have advantages over maneuver platforms such as the once-potent tanks. This is unlikely to be compensated by simply using better camouflage, better tactics, or worse armor advances screening by Russian forces.
There are likely to be situations where offensive maneuver is required to counterattack or seize ground that grants an advantage. These situations will still be useful for armored mobility. There are scenarios where the terrain and the rival’s force design make tanks useful. But, there are other scenarios where what constitutes an effective tank isn’t. “combined arms” To reflect the changing nature of warfare, it will be necessary to refine them. Unmanned aerial systems are clearly having an impact that goes beyond intelligence and targeting. In a future war, the shibboleth that only 72-ton tanks can provide the protection, firepower and mobility necessary for operational success will be tested.
Certainly, tanks afford protection against small arms and shrapnel, but only modern active protection systems can hope to thwart modern munitions, and the tank’s logistics train is easily identified and even more vulnerable. This reduces the overall operational value of the system. It is comforting to have them advance as the force maneuvers into the adversary’s weapons-engagement range. This danger zone is unfortunately much more dangerous and lethal. It exposes maneuver forces to precise fires at greater ranges and can result in losses for the force when it competes against modern combined arms opponents.
Clearly, Steve Biddle disagrees. Although we agree on the necessity of offensive maneuver, he seems to not accept that it is more difficult to maneuver in an age when there are constant surveillance and proliferation of armor-killing weapons. It is, in my view, unhelpful to compare Ukraine’s advances into Kharkiv in September to “the German conquest of France in 1940, or the Six Day War of 1967, or Operation Desert Storm in 1991,” Biddle does. These comparisons are hampered by the differences in scales and fighting methods. Historical analogies cannot be used if they are not able to survive discontinuities. In this case, loitering munitions, other low-cost, easily-operated, unmanned aerial systems, and anti-tank rockets are all examples. Biddle fails to account for the rising costs of maneuver, which is now painfully and intimately familiar to Russia. Biddle does not project the impact on improved munitions, as well as the air-launched options. military analysts You can expect to evolve. proliferate. Both sides in Ukraine use existing assets from the 20th century with improvised upgrades. The other side is not using combined arms to improve a defense that has a longer weapons-engagement zone. The U.S. military must be able to anticipate competing forces with enemies who learn from past conflicts and not assume they will only face those that have the same woeful command-and–control problems as the Russian military. The U.S. military can’t be “future-proofed” False comparisons
For your safety, the tank is not dead. U.S. forces continue to use armor. Ukraine clearly makes good use of its tanks, but could benefit from more advanced models. But for the United States, it’s just not a priority investment for fighting sophisticated peers in high-intensity combat going forward. Chris Dougherty noted that the value marginal investments in this platform over other deficiencies — secure command and control, unmanned aviation, munitions stocks, etc. — is the key question for U.S. force planning. This issue is more than bad Russian tactics and tank design. It’s also about the cost effectiveness of increasingly lethal systems that can defeat modern armor using precision fires or top-down bombing. Even though they have their limitations, reductions in armor in Europe and the U.S. Army is not warranted. However, an increase in heavy armor or an expansion of it are both acceptable. permanent U.S. force presence In Europe, they are also not strategically justified.
Instead of threatening Russia with armour forces at its borders, a defensive orientation is better suited to a strategy for denial in this age. A strategy of denial is not required to shift from a tank-heavy maneuver structure or large numbers lumbering towed guns. It relies on significant precision fires, including self-propelled precision guns and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems. In addition to markedly bolstering deterrence, an investment package that deters but does not exacerbate Putin’s security dilemma has more merit than replaying World War II tank battles.
Strategically, there’s a great opportunity for a change to help create a more intelligent, sustainable and prosperous future. more cooperative defense Europe. This opportunity should not be lost, especially as NATO’s “New Force Model” is being developed. Analysts in Europe have assessed the stark changes in the region’s security environment and recognize the necessity to assume “a greater role in maintaining peace and stability in its own region and neighborhood.” NATO’s European members should be able to take the lead in many areas, including more and better ground combat forcesThey do not need to contribute or augment the U.S. for every combat function. Ukraine is a compelling case of how the United States can draw upon its arsenal to aid allies and partners. Although security assistance is an important component of U.S. strategies, it is not an all-inclusive strategy. future American way of warfare.
NATO should revitalize its modernization plans, and reintroduce the NATO we were once called by Sean Monaghan. “hedgehog defense.” Such an approach calls for extensive investment in long-range precision strike systems — including artillery, munitions, unmanned aerial systems, and missile defenses — which favors NATO’s strengths. This should guide NATO’s transformation and the implementation of the Strategic Concept Madrid, 2022. This document also describes how the U.S. military contributes in its unique ways to the alliance. This may not reduce Washington’s defense expenditures on the continent much, but it will shape how these resources are allocated. It should also shape the Department of Defense’s design and development Priorities extend beyond the conflict zone in Asia.
Implications
Operational and strategic implications are both derived from the shift in offense to defense. These implications require more research, and differentiation over a wider range of domains. The balance is rarely static, and tomorrow’s opponents are undoubtedly already at work on their counter-revolution. Russia will adapt and learn, just like other nations. First, it is important to recognize the signs from the recent conflicts. What are the implications of using emerging technologies and implementing them? reinvigorated national innovation strategy Those who are willing to evaluate their potential will see the benefits. Many legacy systems, including heavy armour, will still have value in other situations. Do not attempt to destroy any tanks, but be aware of the potential benefits of modern, low-cost anti-armor and unmanned aerial systems, which require very little training. Ukraine’s small but successful naval actions Significance could also come in the form of portents, particularly in unconventional applications In the contested littoral region.
Second, Europe’s systemic advantages versus Moscow provide a favorable balance of power. The argument is admittedly based on. resource inputs Instead of real capability outcomes, those are divided over 30 alliances (hopefully 32 in near future). Arguments for Western force planners not to invest in as many. the ideology of the offense Particularly in relation to land forces designed to deter Russia should this be remembered. As NATO consolidates following the war in Ukraine, NATO should not forget the idea of collective defense in Europe. This will require continued attention to Europe’s military modernization. Europe should be focusing on operational credibility as a necessary stepping stone if it truly seeks strategic autonomy — and that focus needs to start with Germany, which needs to put more emphasis on actually delivering These are its words.
Third, U.S. strategists need to look at the bigger picture and realize that there are tradeoffs. American policymakers understandably want to aid Ukraine’s embattled democracy. Important is to make sure that Moscow doesn’t succeed. But policymakers can’t lose sight of strategic priorities, and the risk involved. continued investment shortfalls Asia is also included. In Asia, the future will bring new challenges. severe challenges U.S. technological competitiveness and military security. It’s long past time to get serious The Pacific. China’s diplomatic behavior and military modernization have not become more benign, although its economy has slowed sharply. Some believe it might be more aggressive than its economic slowdown. economic power declinesIt is alarming. Others worry that the United States is moving too slowly. running out of time to deter aggression against Taiwan.
Less symbolism and more substance Stabilization of the Indo-Pacific Region is necessary. Luis Simon, as noted in these pages: “The existence of strategic tradeoffs between Europe and the Indo-Pacific is very real. What the United States does in one region impinges on its ability to resource deterrence in the other region.”
Conclusion
What separates good from great is the ability to grasp larger strategic contexts and apply scarce resources in a disciplined way. bad strategy. Washington is often accused by the media of not responding to the crisis du jour Instead of trying to match ends with means, adopt a disciplined strategy. It is time to think about Asia. align words with action. Misguided investments in either theater could result in strategic defeat, as was stated at the beginning.
This strategy is all about managing risk and making tradeoffs. The U.S. should reflect these fundamental choices in its future grand strategy.
Frank Hoffman, Ph.D. is a former Marine and senior Department of Defense official, who currently works at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. He is also the author of Mars Adapting: Military Change During War. This article is a reflection of the author’s research and opinions and does not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, Department of Defense or any other part of the U.S. government.
Image: U.S. Army photo by Spc. Uriel Ramirez
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