What Trump Can Get Out of the Trilateral Shenzhen Summit

In an era of global conflict and turbulence, the prospect of a trilateral summit bringing together the leaders of China, Russia, and the U.S. is a hopeful sign. But whether the aspiration for a more peaceful and stable global order can be met during the Shenzhen meeting expected this month is open to question.

Doubts are visible in all corners. Still, it would be a mistake to pass up such an extraordinary opportunity. I have written in a recent book that this brand of trilateralism is necessary to knit a dysfunctional global order back together. In particular, this three-way meeting has the possibility to make progress on both nuclear stability and regional conflict, issues that are haunting our world at present with the specter of uncontrolled, violent escalation to even more tragic levels.

Trilateral diplomacy presents unique challenges, but such a summit contains the potential of breaking free from the assumptions that too often stall bilateral or multilateral agreements. Moreover, the China–Russia–U.S. triangle brings together the three most powerful military forces on earth, so difficult but necessary discussion about security issues naturally comes to the fore.

This is likely one reason why the Chinese hosts seem somewhat reluctant to support the trilateral meeting. Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to help mediate various conflicts, but it knows well that U.S.–Russian relations are still fraught and does not wish to be caught in the crossfire.

Russia, perhaps, wants the meeting most of the three powers, if for no other reason than to promote its status as a near-superpower.

President Donald Trump also seems relatively eager. Fresh off his major domestic setback in the midterm elections earlier this month, perhaps he is inclined to seek out positive optics on the world stage. Yet Trump is likely to be disappointed if he thinks that the meeting would yield major movement on either of the two tragic wars that are vexing his foreign policy.

First and foremost, the three leaders should focus on looming nuclear dangers. All three states are sinking enormous resources into nuclear forces modernization. This presents the possibility of more weapons on a higher level of alert, but also the no longer far-fetched possibility of exotic nuclear weapons, such as those deployed in space or working in combination with drones and artificial intelligence.

At a minimum, Putin, Trump, and Xi should agree that such exotic nuclear weapons undermine global stability.

The Trump administration has shown great interest in a broader trilateral arms control agreement, especially after the expiration of Washington and Moscow’s arms control measures. However, insisting on China’s involvement in a three-way arms control accord risks serving up a poison pill which could prevent meaningful progress on other critical issues. It would be prudent to save discussion of a more comprehensive trilateral arms control accord for future meetings once the U.S. has found the format productive.

Strategists know well that nuclear conflict, if that terrible day ever comes, would likely arise out of uncontrolled escalation of a regional conflict. That is why the three leaders should also focus on the two most dangerous situations: Ukraine and Taiwan. In the case of the former, Washington and Beijing can help by pointing out tangible gains for the Kremlin if Putin agrees to end the war in the short term. Such carrots could include trilateral activation of the Arctic transit corridor that has been a long-time goal of the Russian leader and/or legal recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and Donbas.

With respect to Taiwan, the three leaders could helpfully reaffirm Beijing’s cherished principle of “one China” and could go further to jointly recognize that the Taiwan situation should not evolve in the direction of Ukraine, namely as a proxy war impinging on one of the great powers’ core interests. If Washington were to exercise restraint with respect to those two ultra-sensitive situations for Beijing and Moscow, it might receive additional help in ending the U.S.–Iran War.

Beijing, in particular, has strong incentives to help Washington end this unfortunate conflict that endangers the global economy. China’s influence in Tehran should not be underestimated and Moscow could help rein in Iran and its proxies. These three global conflicts top the agenda, of course, but the trilateral summit could also usefully address the deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa, wherein a thicket of brewing conflicts threatens to grow into a full-blown region-wide catastrophe.

This trilateral summit has the potential for significant progress in easing global tensions and returning to overall strategic stability. But this meeting should also set the stage for other small groupings, for example a China–Japan–U.S. trilateral, as well as a Europe–Russia–U.S. working group. Likewise a regular P5 summit gathering the leaders of the permanent members of the UN Security Council is long overdue. Regularizing small groupings of powerful leaders can play a role in arresting and reversing the current slide into global chaos and war.