{"id":2216261,"date":"2024-04-09T08:19:02","date_gmt":"2024-04-09T12:19:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/the-west-doesnt-understand-how-russia-fights-wars\/"},"modified":"2024-04-09T08:19:24","modified_gmt":"2024-04-09T12:19:24","slug":"the-west-doesnt-understand-how-russia-fights-wars","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/the-west-doesnt-understand-how-russia-fights-wars\/","title":{"rendered":"Misunderstanding Russia&#8217;s Warfare Tactics in the West"},"content":{"rendered":"<aside class=\"mashsb-container mashsb-main mashsb-stretched\"><div class=\"mashsb-box\"><div class=\"mashsb-count mash-medium\" style=\"&quot;\"><div class=\"counts mashsbcount\">14<\/div><span class=\"mashsb-sharetext\">SHARES<\/span><\/div><div class=\"mashsb-buttons\"><a class=\"mashicon-facebook mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.conservativenewsdaily.net%2Fbreaking-news%2Fthe-west-doesnt-understand-how-russia-fights-wars%2F\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Facebook<\/span><\/a><a class=\"mashicon-twitter mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?text=&amp;url=https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/?p=2216261&amp;via=ConservNewsDly\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Twitter<\/span><\/a><a class=\"mashicon-subscribe mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"#\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Subscribe<\/span><\/a><div class=\"onoffswitch2 mash-medium mashsb-noshadow\" style=\"display:none\"><\/div><\/div>\n            <\/div>\n                <div style=\"clear:both\"><\/div><\/aside>\n            <!-- Share buttons by mashshare.net - Version: 4.0.47--><p>The text discusses Russia&#8217;s military strategies and the book &#8220;The Russian Way \u200bof Deterrence,&#8221; exploring cultural, historical, and ideological factors influencing Russian warfare tactics.\u200c It highlights differences between Russian and Western deterrence concepts and delves into Russian approaches to conflict, including the\u200c use of cross-domain tactics and reflexive\u200b control. The narrative\u2062 unveils a nuanced view of Russia&#8217;s military mindset and the implications\u2064 of its \u200bactions.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"readmore\">\n    <button onclick=\"showReadMore()\" id=\"readmorebtn\">Read more&#8230;<\/button>\n<\/p>\n<hr id=\"line\">\n<span id=\"more\"><\/p>\n<p><?xml encoding=\"utf-8\" ?><?xml encoding=\"utf-8\" ?><?xml encoding=\"utf-8\" ?><\/p>\n<div class=\"article-content\">\n<p>Given the catastrophic failure of Russia\u2019s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine \u2014 through which Moscow has lost territory it previously controlled, suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, and become an unparalleled pariah on the world stage \u2014 we can be forgiven for asking: What the hell were the Russians thinking?<\/p>\n<p>In <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.sup.org\/books\/title\/?id=34977&#038;local_ref=new\">The Russian Way of Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Coercion, and War<\/a><\/em>, Dmitry Adamsky\u2019s engaging and tightly-argued precis on Russian strategy, we can discern the emergence of the historical, cultural, and political forces that have characterized Moscow\u2019s military doctrine for decades \u2014 and that seem to explain its behavior in Ukraine.<\/p>\n<div class=\"fdrlst__b89e9-paragraph-2-long d-flex justify-content-center\" style=\"margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center; \" id=\"fdrlst__b89e9-2061192604\">\n<div id=\"div-gpt-ad-1379703300879-0\" class=\"mb-30\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"fdrlst__b89e9-6e74a72157a6505a9c6f4c203c219992 fdrlst__b89e9-paragraph-2\" id=\"fdrlst__b89e9-6e74a72157a6505a9c6f4c203c219992\"><\/div>\n<p>A Russophone professor of strategy and international relations in both Israel and Lithuania, Adamsky defines Russian deterrence much more broadly than its traditional Western analog. In his telling \u2014 the results of painstaking research into Russian military circulars, official records, and other definitive sources \u2014 it encompasses \u201cemploying threats, sometimes accompanied by limited use of force, to maintain the status quo, change it, shape the strategic environment within which the interaction occurs, prevent escalation, or de-escalate.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Even more interesting is how the Russian approach is derived. \u201cThe main argument of this book,\u201d Adamsky proclaims, \u201cis that cultural and ideational factors account for the peculiarities of the Russian approach.\u201d Specifically, Russia\u2019s strategic culture, military customs, intelligence traditions, and national mentality condition the country\u2019s warfighting posture, which Adamsky colorfully labels \u201cdeterrence <em>a la Russe<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>One key difference between Russian and Western notions of deterrence is etymological. Adamsky observes that the English term \u201cdeterrence\u201d derives from \u201cterror\u201d or fear and \u201cimplies the infliction of apprehension to shape an adversary\u2019s choices and actions.\u201d By contrast, the Russian equivalent, <em>sderzhivanie<\/em>, connotes restraining or containing a person, a group, or a force straining to change the status quo. Accordingly, deterrence, to Russians, entails an action, specifically the \u201cconcrete engagement of the competitor.\u201d (The Russian language also boasts the word <em>ustrashenie<\/em>, or intimidation, which, like \u201cdeterrence,\u201d derives from the word \u201cterror,\u201d but this term is used only in a negative sense when describing what Russia\u2019s <em>enemies<\/em> seek to do to her.)<\/p>\n<p>Then, too, Russian deterrence fundamentally entails a \u201ccross-domain\u201d approach that employs all available tools, including conventional, nonconventional, and subconventional military means, as well as diplomacy and information warfare. With respect to the latter, while Western strategists generally distinguish between cognitive-psychological tactics and digital-technological capabilities, deterrence <em>a la Russe<\/em> merges these \u201cforms of influence under one roof.\u201d Adamsky notes how, during the Russian engagement in Syria in the early 2010s, Moscow combined these tactics in navigating \u2014 and shaping \u2014 the vicissitudes of inter-confessional conflict fomented by its ally, the Syrian autocrat Bashar Assad.<\/p>\n<div class=\"fdrlst__b89e9-379faef13d6b115278601ea8a127590c fdrlst__b89e9-paragraph-6\" id=\"fdrlst__b89e9-379faef13d6b115278601ea8a127590c\"><\/div>\n<p>So what explains these differences?<\/p>\n<p>Pointing to cultural, ideational, and historical factors, Adamsky accentuates certain \u201csystemic breakdowns\u201d characteristic of Russian culture, such as recklessness, negligence, and carelessness, that have accounted for battlefield catastrophes. In addition, Moscow\u2019s \u201cculture of war tends to emphasize morale and psychological-cognitive factors over material-technological ones\u201d to such an extent that it tends to deploy \u201ca peculiar metaphysics about overcoming the enemy qualitatively, morally.\u201d In the absence of a technological edge, Russians have typically pressed their advantage by emphasizing martial values of endurance, patience, and heroism.<\/p>\n<p>Ideationally, Russia has traditionally relied on \u201creflexive control,\u201d Adamsky\u2019s term for \u201ca complex of measures that forces the adversary to act according to a false picture of reality in a predictable way, favorable to the initiator of the effort, and seemingly benign to the target.\u201d Reflexive control seeks to subtly and undetectably manipulate the adversary\u2019s very sense of reality, a sort of Russian version of gaslighting. Its cousin, <em>maskirovka<\/em>, or military cunningness, incorporates \u201cactive measures,\u201d or affirmative, generally clandestine, but nonviolent measures, to influence state actors to grave detriment, including by sowing discord among citizens.<\/p>\n<p>And throughout Russian and Soviet history, certain traditional concepts proliferated and persisted. These included \u201creasonable sufficiency,\u201d or the smallest amount of military investment that would permit the USSR to maintain rough parity with its Western rivals \u2014 the military equivalent of the term \u201cminimally viable product\u201d used in high-tech. This notion, consistent with the typical Russian inferiority in materiel, required military and political leaders to carefully calibrate resources for the purposes they served, to maximize bang for the ruble. The related idea of \u201ccorrelation of forces and means\u201d sought to ensure a balance of geopolitical power, similar to the Western \u201crealist\u201d school of international relations.<\/p>\n<div class=\"fdrlst__b89e9-d7f965fa8f9cec1e767d57d8f6b0f814 fdrlst__b89e9-paragraph-10\" id=\"fdrlst__b89e9-d7f965fa8f9cec1e767d57d8f6b0f814\"><\/div>\n<p>With this background, the logic of Putin\u2019s ill-fated Ukrainian invasion begins to emerge.<\/p>\n<p>First, Moscow believed, prior to the war, that its comprehensive \u201ccoercive signaling\u201d across all platforms \u2014 informational, diplomatic, and military \u2014 would convey to the West, without firing a single shot, its determination to change the status quo among NATO, Ukraine, and Russia and reshape the post-Cold War order. But, of course, Putin miscalculated, badly. <\/p>\n<p>\u201cMoscow\u2019s coercive signaling achieved the opposite results,\u201d Adamsky writes. \u201cNot only did it push Kyiv closer to Brussels and Washington; it also prompted NATO to beef up its presence along the Russian borders, exercise regularly on a scale unseen since the Cold War, and invest in countermeasuring Russia all across its strategic periphery.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Then, too, the emphasis Moscow has placed on spiritual values like endurance and heroism, including what Adamsky labels \u201cthe traditional Russian glorification of \u2018death on military duty,\u2019\u201d provides insight into how Putin continues to throw recruits into the abattoir in the Donbas, notwithstanding the deaths of more than 100,000 of them in the last two years alone.<\/p>\n<p>In addition, the \u201csystemic breakdowns\u201d afflicting the implementation of Russian doctrine explains many of the signal failures in Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, these characteristics also shed light on Moscow\u2019s nuclear saber-rattling during the conflict. Adamsky outlines the emerging doctrine of \u201cRussian nuclear orthodoxy,\u201d or a \u201cnexus between the Orthodox Church and the nuclear forces.\u201d Putin has coopted much of the former and has fused it with the latter in an effort to enforce traditional values and back them with the ultimate threat.<\/p>\n<p>Adamsky\u2019s prose occasionally suffers from an overreliance on academic jargon and acronyms employed by area specialists but unfamiliar to the general reader. The book would also benefit from a more detailed exposition of examples, which abound in the rich and storied history of Russia.<\/p>\n<p>But <em>The Russian Way of Deterrence<\/em> carefully plumbs the minds, hearts, and souls of Russian military strategists and provides sobering advice for those who would counter them.<\/p>\n<div class=\"fdrlst__b89e9-7d0ff06f41e034706c5958afc3d1ee09 fdrlst__b89e9-after-post-content\" id=\"fdrlst__b89e9-7d0ff06f41e034706c5958afc3d1ee09\"><\/div>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\">    \t\t\t\t\t   \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n<p><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Russia&#8217;s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine resulted in significant losses, raising questions about Russia&#8217;s strategy. With territorial loss, casualties, and global isolation, many wonder about the rationale behind Russian actions<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":751,"featured_media":2216262,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/thefederalist.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/Book-Cover-Featured-Image-8.png","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[546],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2216261","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-federalist"],"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/thefederalist.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/Book-Cover-Featured-Image-8.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2216261","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/751"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2216261"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2216261\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2216262"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2216261"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2216261"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2216261"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}