{"id":1835127,"date":"2023-02-04T11:05:16","date_gmt":"2023-02-04T16:05:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/?p=1835127"},"modified":"2023-02-04T11:06:45","modified_gmt":"2023-02-04T16:06:45","slug":"can-the-u-s-military-learn-from-the-war-in-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/can-the-u-s-military-learn-from-the-war-in-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Can the U.S. Military Learn from the War in Ukraine?"},"content":{"rendered":"<aside class=\"mashsb-container mashsb-main mashsb-stretched\"><div class=\"mashsb-box\"><div class=\"mashsb-count mash-medium\" style=\"float:left\"><div class=\"counts mashsbcount\">20<\/div><span class=\"mashsb-sharetext\">SHARES<\/span><\/div><div class=\"mashsb-buttons\"><a class=\"mashicon-facebook mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.conservativenewsdaily.net%2Fbreaking-news%2Fcan-the-u-s-military-learn-from-the-war-in-ukraine%2F\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Facebook<\/span><\/a><a class=\"mashicon-twitter mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?text=&amp;url=https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/?p=1835127&amp;via=ConservNewsDly\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Twitter<\/span><\/a><a class=\"mashicon-subscribe mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"#\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Subscribe<\/span><\/a><div class=\"onoffswitch2 mash-medium mashsb-noshadow\" style=\"display:none\"><\/div><\/div>\n            <\/div>\n                <div style=\"clear:both\"><\/div><\/aside>\n            <!-- Share buttons by mashshare.net - Version: 4.0.47-->\n<div><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/02\/ukraine-russia-war-lessons-GettyImages-1244878030-e1675340748572.jpg\" class=\"ff-og-image-inserted\" alt=\"image\"   style=\"display:none\"><\/div>\n<div>\n<p>At its core, a country\u2019s defense strategy is a very expensive gamble. The United States spends over $1 trillion annually. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/News-Stories\/Article\/Article\/3252968\/biden-signs-national-defense-authorization-act-into-law\/#:~:text=President%20Joe%20Biden%20has%20signed,billion%20to%20the%20Defense%20Department.\">Spends<\/a> hundreds of billions of dollars on defense\u2014all on the assumption that such investments will allow it to win the next war. Without the United States being directly involved in a conflict, policymakers seldom get to see if these investments have paid off. One window is when other countries fight a war using U.S. military equipment and tactics\u2014such as the one in Ukraine today. Another example is the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, when Israel\u2019s near-defeat prompted a thorough reexamination of U.S. weapons and tactics in Washington. Today, Russia\u2019s war once again poses the question whether the United States needs to reexamine the way it prepares for future conflict: not only which weapons it buys, but also how it envisions great-power wars in the 21st century\u2014whether they will be short, sharp affairs or grinding, protracted struggles.<\/p>\n<p>In 1973, Israel was the last country to have a glimpse into the future without engaging in conflict. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2009975#metadata_info_tab_contents\">Catched<\/a> Surprise attack by an Egyptian-Syrian coalition left Israel flat-footed. Even though Israel won the battle in the end it was defeated by an Egyptian-Syrian-led coalition. The war was a failure for the Jewish State. Despite having a seasoned military leadership with decades of collective combat experience\u2014and being equipped with U.S. weaponry\u2014Israel <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ausa.org\/publications\/1973-arab-israeli-war-insights-multi-domain-operations\">Loss<\/a> Over 800 armored cars and 100 attack aircraft. Six years after Israel defeated a combined Arab army at the Six-Day War and stunned the world, the Yom Kippur War erupted in stark contrast. It dragged on for weeks and was forced to be ended by the United States. <a href=\"https:\/\/amcmuseum.org\/history\/operation-nickel-grass\/\">assistance<\/a> to backfill equipment losses, and brought Israel uncomfortably close to defeat.<\/p>\n<p>The Yom Kippur War was a wake-up call\u2014and not just for Israel. Even though the United States was not a direct participant, U.S. Army leaders <a href=\"https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/213470\">witnessed<\/a> in real time how U.S. equipment and tactics used by the Israeli army fared against their Soviet counterparts in the Egyptian and Syrian militaries. The United States did not like what it saw. If U.S. forces did not <a href=\"https:\/\/www.armyupress.army.mil\/Journals\/Military-Review\/English-Edition-Archives\/January-February-2023\/Burke\/\">adapt<\/a>, Washington surmised, they might come similarly close to defeat\u2014or worse\u2014in a potential future conflict.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div>\n<p>At its core, a country\u2019s defense strategy is a very expensive gamble. Every year, the United States <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/News-Stories\/Article\/Article\/3252968\/biden-signs-national-defense-authorization-act-into-law\/#:~:text=President%20Joe%20Biden%20has%20signed,billion%20to%20the%20Defense%20Department.\">spends<\/a> hundreds of billions of dollars on defense\u2014all on the assumption that such investments will allow it to win the next war. Absent a conflict in which the United States is directly involved, policymakers rarely get a window into whether these bets have actually paid off. One window is when other countries fight a war using U.S. military equipment and tactics\u2014such as the one in Ukraine today. Another example is the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, when Israel\u2019s near-defeat prompted a thorough reexamination of U.S. weapons and tactics in Washington. Today, Russia\u2019s war once again poses the question whether the United States needs to reexamine the way it prepares for future conflict: not only which weapons it buys, but also how it envisions great-power wars in the 21st century\u2014whether they will be short, sharp affairs or grinding, protracted struggles.<\/p>\n<p>When, in 1973, the United States last had a window into the future of conflict without fighting in one, Israel was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2009975#metadata_info_tab_contents\">caught<\/a> flat-footed by the surprise attack of an Egyptian-Syrian-led coalition. Although Israel prevailed in the end, the war was a debacle for the Jewish state. Despite having a seasoned military leadership with decades of collective combat experience\u2014and being equipped with U.S. weaponry\u2014Israel <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ausa.org\/publications\/1973-arab-israeli-war-insights-multi-domain-operations\">lost<\/a> more than 800 armored vehicles and 100 attack aircraft. Just six years after Israel stunned the world by quickly crushing a combined Arab army during the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War stood in stark contrast: It dragged on for weeks, required emergency U.S. <a href=\"https:\/\/amcmuseum.org\/history\/operation-nickel-grass\/\">assistance<\/a> to backfill equipment losses, and brought Israel uncomfortably close to defeat.<\/p>\n<p>The Yom Kippur War was a wake-up call\u2014and not just for Israel. Even though the United States was not a direct participant, U.S. Army leaders <a href=\"https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/213470\">witnessed<\/a> in real time how U.S. equipment and tactics used by the Israeli army fared against their Soviet counterparts in the Egyptian and Syrian militaries. The United States did not like what it saw. If U.S. forces did not <a href=\"https:\/\/www.armyupress.army.mil\/Journals\/Military-Review\/English-Edition-Archives\/January-February-2023\/Burke\/\">adapt<\/a>, Washington surmised, they might come similarly close to defeat\u2014or worse\u2014in a potential future conflict.<\/p>\n<p>And so, the U.S. military went to work, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.armyupress.army.mil\/Journals\/Military-Review\/English-Edition-Archives\/January-February-2020\/Orwin-US-Israeli\/\">studying<\/a> every aspect of the war. Out of those lessons, the Army <a href=\"https:\/\/muse.jhu.edu\/article\/213470\">developed<\/a> a new doctrine\u2014AirLand Battle\u2014as well as an updated training regimen that laid out a new blueprint for the post-Vietnam War, post-draft military. And while the United States never directly fought the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Yom Kippur War\u2014and the lessons the United States drew from it\u2014provided the intellectual bedrock of how to blend ground maneuvers, precision air power, and overall speed: the very mix of strategies that enabled the United States\u2019 lightning defeat of Soviet-equipped Iraq during the First Gulf War. Even half a century later, the Yom Kippur War <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2022\/08\/an-alternative-history-of-airland-battle-part-i\/\">continues<\/a> to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ausa.org\/publications\/1973-arab-israeli-war-insights-multi-domain-operations\">shape<\/a> how the United States military <a href=\"https:\/\/thestrategybridge.org\/the-bridge\/2019\/11\/19\/the-importance-of-the-tactical-level-the-arab-israeli-war-of-1973\">thinks<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/mwi.usma.edu\/timeless-lessons-october-1973-arab-israeli-war\/\">plans<\/a> for the future.<\/p>\n<p>Today, Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine could well provide as many insights about 21st-century warfare as the Yom Kippur War did for 20th-century conflicts. For decades, the U.S. Defense Department has <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2022\/11\/the-bias-for-capability-over-capacity-has-created-a-brittle-force\/\">shaped<\/a> the U.S. military for flash conflicts and quick interventions where speed and precision rule. But one year into a war that some <a href=\"https:\/\/www.foxnews.com\/us\/gen-milley-says-kyiv-could-fall-within-72-hours-if-russia-decides-to-invade-ukraine-sources\">thought<\/a> would last only days, Ukraine raises the question of whether the age of industrial warfare has returned. The consequence: The United States would need to prepare to fight a very different type of conflict than it plans for today.<\/p>\n<p>A <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2022\/04\/the-tank-is-dead-long-live-the-javelin-the-switchblade-the\/\">lot<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/the-tanks-death-has-been-exaggerated\/\">of<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2022\/09\/the-tank-is-not-obsolete-and-other-observations-about-the-future-of-combat\/#:~:text=They%20remain%20a%20key%20ground,critical%20role%20during%20offensive%20operations.\">ink<\/a> has already been spilled questioning the continued relevance of the tank, for example, given the Ukrainians\u2019 successful use of anti-tank weapons and ubiquitous small to large unmanned aerial systems in ground combat. The current war also raises questions about whether helicopters still have a place on the modern battlefield, given the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.oryxspioenkop.com\/2022\/02\/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html\">75 or so<\/a> Russian helicopters, including scores of the most advanced models, that the Ukrainians have destroyed or damaged, mostly using relatively old air defense <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/aerospace-defense\/exclusive-us-army-replenishes-stinger-missiles-after-ukraine-shipments-2022-05-27\/\">missiles<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>And even though the Ukraine war is primarily a land war, the conflict has similarly raised disconcerting questions for the U.S. Navy. The sinking of the Russian cruiser <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-europe-61103927\">Moskva<\/a>\u2014as well as the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.oryxspioenkop.com\/2022\/02\/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html\">dozen or so<\/a> other, smaller Russian vessels that have been damaged or destroyed by a country without any serious naval forces of its own\u2014should raise serious questions about the survivability of large surface ships in modern war. Conversely, Ukraine\u2019s success at employing smaller <a href=\"https:\/\/www.rand.org\/blog\/2022\/11\/the-age-of-uncrewed-surface-vessels.html\">uncrewed vessels<\/a> suggests a potential alternative way to wield naval power.<\/p>\n<p>The lessons for the U.S. Air Force have been no less profound. Despite the prewar <a href=\"https:\/\/ukrainetoday.org\/2022\/11\/07\/russian-airpower-could-overwhelm-ukraine-unless-west-steps-in-experts-warn\/\">predictions<\/a> that Russian airpower would quickly overwhelm Ukraine absent NATO\u2019s establishment of a no-fly zone, Russia has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.voanews.com\/a\/uk-defense-ministry-russia-s-lack-of-air-superiority-exacerbated-due-to-poor-training\/6823338.html\">failed<\/a> to gain air dominance and the Ukrainian Air Force is still <a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/davidaxe\/2022\/11\/12\/fly-low-get-aggressive-how-ukrainian-pilots-fought-the-russian-air-force-to-a-standstill\/?sh=f45753e27412\">flying<\/a> nearly one year into the war. The Ukraine conflict shows that airpower can, indeed, still operate within the range of enemy missiles\u2014not with impunity, but not with certain death, either. Even more importantly, the war <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/russia-ukraine-war-drone-advances-6591dc69a4bf2081dcdd265e1c986203\">highlights<\/a> the increasing importance of drones to modern combat in the land, sea, and air domains. Indeed, in some sense, manned aircraft have taken a backseat to remotely piloted aircraft in the battle for the skies over Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>Key lessons have emerged for space and cyberspace as well. The Ukraine war has been called the first <a href=\"https:\/\/spacenews.com\/on-national-security-drawing-lessons-from-the-first-commercial-space-war\/\">commercial space war<\/a>. Whether or not the label is accurate, there is no doubt that private space companies have played an outsized role in the conflict\u2014from keeping Ukrainian forces <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2022\/11\/22\/ukraine-internet-starlink-elon-musk-russia-war\/\">online<\/a> to providing the <a href=\"https:\/\/interactive.satellitetoday.com\/via\/november-2022\/how-satellite-imagery-magnified-ukraine-to-the-world\/\">imagery<\/a> that has shaped media coverage of the conflict around the world. In cyberspace, Russia\u2019s vaunted capabilities never <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2022\/12\/12\/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607\">lived up<\/a> to expectations, raising questions of whether cyberattacks really are the next weapons of mass destruction\u2014as some have <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/a-cyberattack-could-wreak-destruction-comparable-to-a-nuclear-weapon-112173\">claimed<\/a>\u2014or whether their effects are somewhat more limited.<\/p>\n<p>In sum, a year in, the Ukraine war is providing the same wealth of insights that the Yom Kippur War did a half-century ago. But there is one major difference that could turn into a problem: Whereas the Yom Kippur War painted such a vivid and bleak picture for the U.S. military that it was forced to innovate, the Ukraine war looks like a win for U.S. equipment and tactics\u2014at least for now. As a result, the same impetus to heed the lessons and effect change is not there.<\/p>\n<p>To its credit, the United States is doubling down on the capabilities that the Ukrainians have employed successfully. The Army, for example, is buying <a href=\"https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/262594\/army_contract_actions_to_increase_155_mm_artillery_shell_body_capacity\">more<\/a> artillery shells, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/land\/2022\/03\/25\/stinger-and-javelin-production-can-be-boosted-says-army-acquisitions-chief\/\">more<\/a> Javelin anti-tank and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/industry\/2022\/12\/02\/lockheed-gets-himars-contract-to-replenish-stock-sent-to-ukraine\/\">more<\/a> High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers to make up for those expended in Ukraine. These, however, are arguably the easy lessons. They do not require the United States to do anything differently, only buy more of the same.<\/p>\n<p>The United States is also right not to act on the non-lessons of the conflict. In some cases, the Ukraine war is simply not instructive. For example, Russia has <a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/DefenceHQ\/status\/1612338180044242946\">kept<\/a> its most advanced aircraft mostly over Russian airspace and out of range of Ukrainian air defense. The war, therefore, only offers inconclusive results so far on whether stealth aircraft or air defenses have the upper hand.<\/p>\n<p>In other cases, the technological lessons may be clear, but the operational implications are not. Take the great tank debate, for instance. The battle for Kyiv <a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/davidaxe\/2022\/10\/19\/the-russians-are-losing-10-tanks-a-day-as-ukrainian-troops-advance\/?sh=4ecd50221536\">showed<\/a> that tanks are very vulnerable. At the same time, Ukraine\u2019s successful counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts demonstrated that there are few alternatives to armored warfare for taking ground, especially in open terrain. And so, it is perhaps unsurprising that the U.S. military is similarly split. The Marine Corps <a href=\"https:\/\/www.marinecorpstimes.com\/news\/your-marine-corps\/2021\/05\/25\/marine-corps-deactivates-its-final-active-duty-tank-battalion\/\">jettisoned<\/a> its tanks, while the Army is <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/digital-show-dailies\/ausa\/2022\/10\/14\/what-comes-after-abrams-tanks-the-army-is-working-on-possibilities\/\">pushing<\/a> ahead with ever more modern ones.<\/p>\n<p>The jury is still out, however, on whether the United States will embrace the hard lessons of the war\u2014those that actually require the U.S. military to fundamentally change direction\u2014especially if it requires learning from Russia\u2019s failures, rather than Ukraine\u2019s successes. The U.S. Army is still <a href=\"https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/262755\/army_awards_contract_to_develop_future_vertical_lift_capability#:~:text=The%20Army%20chose%20the%20Bell,of%20the%20FLRAA%20in%202025.\">pressing ahead<\/a> with its Future Vertical Lift program\u2014the costly development of five new helicopter types\u2014despite all the Russian helicopter losses. The Navy is still <a href=\"https:\/\/news.usni.org\/2022\/09\/14\/cno-navy-will-lead-ddgx-design-effort-wargames-call-for-fewer-large-surface-warships\">investing<\/a> in surface ships, despite the sinking of the Moskva and other Russian vessels. And the Air Force remains <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/air\/2022\/09\/12\/us-air-force-warns-of-aging-fighters-poor-purchasing-efforts\/\">committed<\/a> to its manned aircraft fleet, despite the dominance of drones in the airspace.<\/p>\n<p>Even more fundamentally, the United States needs to rethink the balance between capability and capacity. From <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/air\/2022\/03\/14\/what-should-be-the-united-states-next-move-on-hypersonic-tech\/\">missiles costing tens of millions of dollars each<\/a> to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/think\/opinion\/air-force-unveils-b-21-stealth-plane-bomber-not-boondoggle-change-rcna59674\">planes costing hundreds of millions<\/a> to <a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2018\/05\/us-navys-13-billion-supercarrier-just-got-even-more-expensive\/\">ships costing billions<\/a>, the U.S. military continues to default to the high end, even if it means acquiring fewer systems. But the Ukraine war\u2019s most important lesson is that cheap and plentiful may, in fact, trump the exquisite but expensive. Indeed, Russia\u2019s use of relatively small numbers of wonder weapons\u2014such as <a href=\"https:\/\/news.usni.org\/2022\/05\/19\/russian-hypersonic-missiles-underperforming-in-ukraine-conflict-northcom-says\">hypersonic missiles<\/a>\u2014seemingly bought it little success. At the same time, the Ukraine war shows\u2014just like the Yom Kippur War did\u2014that numbers matter. Modern wars involve significant losses.<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, for all the intense public debate on whether to give <a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/business\/why-the-us-is-giving-ukraine-a-patriot-air-defense-system\/2022\/12\/29\/9afdfb6a-8799-11ed-b5ac-411280b122ef_story.html\">Patriot air defense systems<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/2023\/01\/26\/us-sends-ukraine-advanced-abrams-tanks-00079648\">Abrams and Leopard tanks<\/a>, or <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2023\/jan\/31\/us-will-not-supply-f-16-fighter-jets-to-ukraine-says-joe-biden\">F-16 fighter jets<\/a> to Ukraine, it currently appears that mass\u2014more than any one particular weapons system\u2014will determine the war\u2019s outcome. While individual capabilities certainly help, as multiple commentators have <a href=\"https:\/\/abcnews.go.com\/Politics\/us-patriot-missiles-game-changer-ukraine\/story?id=95222548\">noted<\/a>, specific weapons systems <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2023\/01\/27\/europe\/ukraine-war-nato-tanks-analysis-intl-hnk-ml\/index.html\">are<\/a> unlikely to meaningfully change the balance unless they are provided in sufficient quantities. In a protracted war, the question becomes less who has the silver bullet and more who simply has more bullets. And so, the United States needs to ensure that it, indeed, has more bullets.<\/p>\n<p>To be fair, the Ukraine war is only one data point, and the U.S. military is not Russia\u2019s. U.S. hardware may be more survivable and employed using more thoughtful tactics than the analogous Russian platforms. U.S. leadership may also be more circumspect and not fall victim to the same foibles as the Russians have in Ukraine. And U.S. strategy may, indeed, be better\u2014raising the likelihood that the United States could win fast and not end up in a protracted conflict. (Although the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would suggest otherwise.)<\/p>\n<p>Embracing the full implications of the war in Ukraine requires accepting the fact that there are still lessons to be learned from Russia\u2019s failures. At the very least, the onus for future U.S. defense strategy must shift. Why won\u2019t American helicopters, ships, or aircraft suffer the same fate as their Russian counterparts? Why won\u2019t the next war turn into a protracted one? Why won\u2019t the next war look more like the one in Ukraine?<\/p>\n<p>Fortunately, major wars are rare events. And wars such as Russia\u2019s in Ukraine\u2014which provide a meaningful test of U.S. hardware and strategic assumptions without costing American blood\u2014are even rarer occasions. But whether the war enables the United States to place wiser bets on the future as it prepares for the next conflict partly depends on the U.S. military\u2019s ability to engage in introspection. And that, in turn, hinges on whether the United States allows itself to be blinded by Ukraine\u2019s battlefield successes and potential victory.<\/p>\n<p>If the United States does learn the lessons of this war, as it did after the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago, it may secure the U.S. military\u2019s qualitative edge for decades to come. If it does not, it may not get a second chance.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>At its core, a country\u2019s defense strategy is a very expensive gamble. The United States spends over $1 trillion annually. Spends hundreds of billions of dollars on defense\u2014all on the assumption that such investments will allow it to win the next war. Without the United States being directly involved in a conflict, policymakers seldom get &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1835130,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/cndimages.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com\/breaking-news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/01\/IMG_2758-scaled-1.jpg","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[547],"tags":[8231,4505,7238,6991,6696],"class_list":["post-1835127","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-bongino-report","tag-learn","tag-military","tag-u-s","tag-ukraine","tag-war"],"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/cndimages.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com\/breaking-news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/01\/IMG_2758-scaled-1.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1835127","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1835127"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1835127\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1835130"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1835127"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1835127"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1835127"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}