{"id":1348576,"date":"2022-02-28T07:53:03","date_gmt":"2022-02-28T12:53:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/?p=1348576"},"modified":"2022-02-28T08:12:49","modified_gmt":"2022-02-28T13:12:49","slug":"hybrid-warfare-is-one-term-with-many-meanings","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/hybrid-warfare-is-one-term-with-many-meanings\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cHybrid Warfare\u201d Is One Term With Many Meanings"},"content":{"rendered":"<aside class=\"mashsb-container mashsb-main mashsb-stretched\"><div class=\"mashsb-box\"><div class=\"mashsb-count mash-medium\" style=\"float:left\"><div class=\"counts mashsbcount\">16<\/div><span class=\"mashsb-sharetext\">SHARES<\/span><\/div><div class=\"mashsb-buttons\"><a class=\"mashicon-facebook mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.conservativenewsdaily.net%2Fbreaking-news%2Fhybrid-warfare-is-one-term-with-many-meanings%2F\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Facebook<\/span><\/a><a class=\"mashicon-twitter mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/intent\/tweet?text=&amp;url=https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/?p=1348576&amp;via=ConservNewsDly\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Twitter<\/span><\/a><a class=\"mashicon-subscribe mash-medium mash-nomargin mashsb-noshadow\" href=\"#\" target=\"_top\" rel=\"nofollow\"><span class=\"icon\"><\/span><span class=\"text\">Subscribe<\/span><\/a><div class=\"onoffswitch2 mash-medium mashsb-noshadow\" style=\"display:none\"><\/div><\/div>\n            <\/div>\n                <div style=\"clear:both\"><\/div><\/aside>\n            <!-- Share buttons by mashshare.net - Version: 4.0.47--><p style=\"text-align: center;\"><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019: One Term, Many Meanings<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>By Tarik Solmaz<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>Introduction<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Russia&#8217;s recent aggression against Ukraine has brought renewed prominence to the debate around \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 (see e.g., The Economist 2022; The Wall Street Journal 2022; The New York Times 2022). However, the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 is still as contested as it is popular. When scholars or practitioners mention the \u2018hybrid model of warfare\u2019 they do not always imply the same thing. Moreover, the definitions regarding \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 adopted by Western states and institutions show significant differences. So, ultimately, the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 obscures more than it explains. This essay argues that the ideational ambiguity regarding \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 arises from two main reasons: First, the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has been widely discussed, criticized, and reformulated comprising new elements that were lacking in the initial conception since it was first popularized by Frank Hoffman in his 2007 monograph <i>Conflict in the 21<sup>st <\/sup>Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars<\/i>. Second, the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has often been used to refer to inapplicable phenomena. That is, the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has been used to describe new cases that lack essential features of the original concept. As such, the idea of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has continuously been subjected to conceptual stretching, and thus, today, it seems rather a vague and ambiguous concept. Yet still, a close investigation reveals that there are five major interpretations of the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 that are related yet different: <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><span><span><span><a name=\"_Hlk95766192\" id=\"_Hlk95766192\"><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019 as <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><a name=\"_Hlk95837779\" id=\"_Hlk95837779\"><span><span><span>the employment of synergistic fusion of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and criminal activities in the same battlespace. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019 as <a name=\"_Hlk95837826\" id=\"_Hlk95837826\">the combined use of regular and irregular forces <\/a>under a unified direction. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019 as the use of various military and non-military means to menace an enemy.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019 as sub-threshold activities involving any mix of violent and non-violent means. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019 as a way of achieving political goals by using non-violent subversive activities. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>This essay has two purposes: to provide an overview of the different conceptual versions of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 within a historical context and to briefly discuss the possible implications of the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 for the West. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019: An Ever-Stretching Concept<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The use of the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 dates to the 1990s. To our best knowledge, the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 first appeared in Thomas Mockaitis\u2019 book entitled <i>British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era<\/i> in 1995 (Mockaitis 1995, 14-39). In the years that followed, several authors used the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 to refer to a diverse range of military campaigns (see e.g., Walker 1998, Nemeth 2002, Dupont 2003, Carayannis 2003, Simpson 2005). Indeed, the way these authors characterize \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 was not that similar to each other. Nevertheless, in the final analyses, it seems right to argue that they have used the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 to indicate a mode of warfare that can be simply classified as neither purely conventional nor irregular. Yet, in truth, on the subject of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019, the theoretical and practical implications of the abovementioned authors were rather limited. \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The first widely disseminated articulation of the term &#8216;hybrid warfare&#8217; was a speech by General James Mattis at Defence Forum backed by the Naval Institute and Marine Corps Association in September 2005 (Hoffman 2007, 14). Right after the conference, Mattis and Hoffman published a brief paper on \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 in November 2005. In that paper, the authors argued that the future threats will be a merger of different modes of warfare, and they call this synthesis \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019. The concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 was not fully developed in that article, and the writers described the key characteristics of the \u2018hybrid model of warfare\u2019, rather than defining it (Mattis and Hoffman 2005, 18-19).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Two years later, Hoffman published his seminal monograph and formulated his own \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 concept based on \u2018fourth-generation warfare\u2019, \u2018compound warfare\u2019, \u2018unrestricted warfare\u2019, and the \u20182005 National Defence Strategy\u2019. This time, Hoffman provided a well-organized and detailed definition of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019. Also, it was Hoffman\u2019s monograph that popularized the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 in the US academic and military-practitioner circles. Moreover, Hoffman\u2019s definition has shaped the US Army\u2019s understanding of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 to a notable extent (see e.g., Casey 2008, 28; US Army 2010, 1-1; US Army 2011, 1-5). Therefore, I tend to see his 2007 monograph as \u2018the point of origin\u2019 of the great debate on \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019<\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>In his monograph, Hoffman (2007, 8) has stated that:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>According to Hoffman (2007, 36), Hezbollah\u2019s method of warfare carried out in the face of the Israeli army during the 34-day war represents the most striking example of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019. Hoffman (2007, 37) states that \u201cHezbollah\u2019s use of C802 anti-ship cruise missiles and volley of rockets represents a sample of what \u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019 might look like.\u201d Arguably, he principally aims to raise awareness about the increasing state-like military capabilities of violent non-state actors in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, he has pointed out that \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 can also be conducted by states (Hoffman 2007, 8). In this regard, Hoffman (2007, 28) has maintained that states can shift their regular forces to irregular units and employ non-traditional warfare tactics. So, in the final analysis, his notion of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019, in substance, refers to non-state actors with high-tech weapons and states who adopt irregular tactics.<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>Indeed, Hoffman\u2019s idea of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 well describes what 21st century insurgents such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, ISIS, and PKK have done over the last two decades. Also, it captures state-based irregular fighters such as Russia\u2019s masked troops known as \u2018little green men\u2019, China\u2019s maritime militias, and Iran\u2019s Quds Force. So, although non-state actors with sophisticated weapons and states who employ irregular tactics are not completely new, today they seem dominant in today\u2019s armed conflicts, as Hoffman forecasted correctly in 2007.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Shortly after Hoffman published his monograph, the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 gathered significant attention in the US military debates, and numerous military thinkers reviewed and reformulated it. Many scholars called into question the newness of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019. However, an in-depth\u00a0examination shows that <a name=\"_Hlk95332419\" id=\"_Hlk95332419\">unlike Hoffman, whose definition specifically focuses on the fusion of conventional and irregular forces in the same battlespace, some of them have characterized \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 as the simultaneous use of regular and irregular forces in the same operation. <\/a>For example, in a book entitled <i>Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present<\/i>, which is one the most cited works in the existing \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 literature, a group of military historians have maintained that the history of war is full of examples of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 (Murray and Mansoor 2012). Nevertheless, the authors define \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 \u201cas conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and nonstate actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose\u201d (Mansoor 2012, 2). Namely, they primarily focus on the combined coordination of conventional and irregular forces without referring to Hoffman\u2019s core idea that is, the merger of regular and irregular elements into a unified force. This line of argument has gained traction in the \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 literature, and several authors have continued to characterize \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 as the coordinated and combined use of regular and irregular forces under a unified strategic direction in the following years (see e.g., Deep 2015; Boot 2015; 15-18; Murray II 2017, 1). <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>On the other hand, another group of military thinkers such as McCuen (2008, 108), Jordan (2008, 20), Glenn (2009), Lasica (2009, 3), McWilliams (2009, 18-19), and Burbridge (2013, 11) has found the concept \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 quite battlefield centric. According to these authors, \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 is realized at all levels of war, and thus, the strategic use of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 is noteworthy as well. In that sense, they revised the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 by adding some non-kinetic elements to the scope of it. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>For example, Glenn (2009) defines \u2018hybrid threat\u2019 as follows:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>An adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of (1) political, military, economic, social, and information means, and (2) conventional, irregular, catastrophic, terrorism, and disruptive\/criminal warfare methods.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>What distinguishes this conceptual version of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 from those discussed earlier is the stress on non-kinetic means and techniques<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>. As such, <\/span><\/span><\/span><span lang=\"EN-GB\" xml:lang=\"EN-GB\"><span><span>unlike the tactical-operational understanding of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019, which is inherently military-oriented, the two constituent parts of this conceptual version of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 have become military and non-military instruments. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO preferred the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 to refer to Russia\u2019s so-called \u2018new\u2019 form of conflict in Ukraine. This choice, arguably, is the most crucial turning point in the evolution of the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019.<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>First, the use and popularity of the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 increased dramatically in the West\u2019s military and strategic debates. Second, because Russia&#8217;s activities in Ukraine did not fully fit the previous conceptualizations of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019, the meaning of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 was subjected to conceptual stretching once again. Briefly speaking, Russia achieved its political goals in Ukraine by employing a mix of non-kinetic tools including cyber-attacks, propaganda, disinformation, economic coercion, and diplomatic pressure, and military methods such as conducting covert operations and empowering proxy warriors. In addition, Russia systemically denied its involvement in Ukraine. So, Russia\u2019s so-called \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 in Ukraine did not only consist of a combination of regular and irregular elements or the combination of military and non-military tools but also covert action and deception. So, the main defining characteristics of Russia\u2019s subversive campaign in Ukraine were creating ambiguity and enabling plausible deniability. Therefore, in this context, the \u2018hybrid model of warfare\u2019 was largely associated with the so-called &#8216;Gerasimov doctrine&#8217; that emphasizes the blurring distinctions between war and peace. As such, the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 was generally characterized by sub-threshold activities including kinetic and non-kinetic methods in both scholarly papers, and policy\/strategy documents of Western institutions (see e.g., NATO 2014; NATO n.d., The European Commission 2016; Hybrid CoE n.d; Military Balance 2015, 5; Popescu 2015, 1). In truth, this understanding of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 appears to be a cocktail of previous conceptual versions.<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>Namely, it captures nearly all categories included in \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 literature: conventional and irregular; military and non-military. Nevertheless, as noted above, this formulation gives particular emphasis to plausible deniability and the notion of <span>remaining the threshold of the outright act of war, and thus, represents a departure from previous conceptualizations of \u2018hybrid warfare.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>In the years that followed, the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has continued to evolve and gain new meaning in the West\u2019s strategic discourse. This is because Western politicians, scholars, think-tank experts, and media have often been used the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 just to refer to non-violent subversive actions such as cyber-attacks, economic coercion, disinformation campaign, election meddling, and recently weaponization of migrants (See e.g., Der Spiegel 2016; Sahin 2017; Deni 2017; Kuczy\u0144ski 2019; Shedd and Stradner 2020; Aslund 2021; EURACTIV 2017; BBC 2021). Obviously, this conceptual version of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 represents an extreme departure from the original approach to \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 which has originally been included in the West\u2019s military lexicon as a battlefield-centric concept.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>As a result, clearly, the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 <a name=\"_Hlk96112817\" id=\"_Hlk96112817\">has been used to describe a wide range of aggressive activities with different characteristics<\/a>, and this makes it a highly ambiguous concept after all. Let us continue by asking the \u2018so what\u2019 question: <i>Why does that matter? <\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>Implications<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Without a doubt, defining \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 is not just a matter of intellectual debate. As discussed earlier, the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has already deeply been embedded in and part of the West\u2019s military and strategic lexicon. Western governments and institutions have often used the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 (or \u2018hybrid threats\u2019) to refer to contemporary security challenges. However,<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>as already mentioned<span><span>, <\/span><\/span>this usage is not based on a mutual understanding of what \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 entails. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>In much of its doctrinal documents, the US Army has adopted <span>Hoffman\u2019s definition of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 or the slightly modified versions of it. <\/span>For example, the US Army\u2019s Training Circular (TC) 7-100 codifies \u2018hybrid threats\u2019 \u201cas the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and\/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects\u201d (The US Department of Army 2010, v). More recently, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, defined a \u2018hybrid threat\u2019 as \u201cthe diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal elements acting in concert to achieve mutually benefitting effects\u201d (The US Department of Army 2019, 1-3). These definitions reflect the battlefield-oriented understanding of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019. However, one may encounter notably different definitions regarding \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 in the US military documents. For example, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G-2, defines \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 as <\/span><\/span><\/span><span lang=\"TR\" xml:lang=\"TR\"><span><span>\u201c<\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>the use of political, social, criminal, and other non-kinetic means employed to overcome military limitations.\u201d Obviously, <\/span><\/span><\/span><span lang=\"EN-GB\" xml:lang=\"EN-GB\"><span><span>non-kinetic means have come to the fore in this definition of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 (TRADOC 2015, 94).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>On the other hand, currently, NATO and the EU, characterize \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 as a way of achieving political objectives by employing a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic means while remaining below the threshold of traditional war in their official documents. For example, according to the NATO (n.d) website: <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Hybrid threats combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces. Hybrid methods are used to blur the lines between war and peace and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations. They aim to destabilise and undermine societies.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Likewise, the EU&#8217;s &#8216;Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats declares that:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The concept of hybrid threats aims to capture the mixture of conventional and unconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare (The European Commission 2016). <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>However, Western policymakers and practitioners have mostly associated the term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 with non-violent destabilization operations. In this regard, for example, alleged Russian interference in the 2016 United States election, Russia\u2019s cyber-attacks against Western institutions, and Belarus\u2019 weaponization of Middle Eastern refugees have been labeled an act of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 (<a name=\"_Hlk96709045\" id=\"_Hlk96709045\">France24 2018; EURACTIV 2017<\/a>; BBC 2021<\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>). This indicates that Western decision-makers use this term in a way that is inconsistent even with their own definitions, and this exacerbates the lack of conceptual clarity regarding \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Today, Western states and organizations strongly emphasize that the West ought to be prepared to counter \u2018hybrid threats\u2019. Then, the question that should be asked is: How is that possible given that key actors\/players in the West\u2019s security architecture do not agree on the core meaning of the concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019? <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>Conclusion <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The term \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has drawn remarkable attention in the West\u2019s strategic debates over the last fifteen years, and apparently, it will continue to draw attention. Nevertheless, it is still an extremely contested concept. The definitions concerning \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 significantly differ from each other.<\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span> Moreover, <\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>it has been used to describe <a name=\"_Hlk95480113\" id=\"_Hlk95480113\">a<\/a> wide range of different phenomena <a name=\"_Hlk96469417\" id=\"_Hlk96469417\">that<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>necessitate different countermeasures<\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>. The concept of \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 has been so stretched that today hybrid warfare, <a name=\"_Hlk96190077\" id=\"_Hlk96190077\">which has originally been included in the West\u2019s military lexicon as a battlefield-centric concept<\/a>, has even been used to refer to just non-kinetic destabilization operations. Hence, <\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>alongside a poor understanding of such a concept, <a name=\"_Hlk96469203\" id=\"_Hlk96469203\">the ideational confusion weakens the capabilities of Western states and organizations to effectively deal with what they deem \u2018hybrid threats\u2019.<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span> As such, the concept of hybrid warfare seems to be suffering the same fate as \u2018terrorism\u2019 which is another contested term in the strategic lexicon. Hence, eliminating such a conceptual haziness should be prioritized by Western policymakers and defense intellectuals.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><b><span><span><span>References<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>\u00c5slund, Anders. 2021. \u201cConfronting the Kremlin&#8217;s New Hybrid War in Europe.\u201d <i>Project Syndicate<\/i>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/confronting-russian-hybrid-war-in-europe-by-anders-aslund-2021-11\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/confronting-russian-hybrid-war-in-europe-by-anders-aslund-2021-11<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 9 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>BBC. 2021. Poland Border Crisis: EU to Widen Belarus Sanctions as Row Intensifies <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/world-europe-59289998\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/world-europe-59289998<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>.\u00a0\u00a0 Accessed on 10 February 2021.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Boot, Max. 2015. \u201cCountering Hybrid Warfare.\u201d In <i>Armed Conflict Survey<\/i> 1(1): 11-20. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Burbridge, Dean A. 2013. <i>Employing U.S. Information Operations Against Hybrid Warfare Threats<\/i>.<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania:<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>United States Army War College.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Carayannis, Tatiana. 2003. \u201cThe Complex Wars of the Congo: Towards a New Analytic Approach.\u201d <i>Journal of Asian and African Studies<\/i>, 38(2-3): 232\u2013255.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Casey, George C. 2008. \u201cAmerica&#8217;s Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict.\u201d <i>Army Magazine<\/i> October 2008: 19-28. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Complex crises call for adaptable and durable capabilities. 2015. \u00a0<i>The Military Balance<\/i>, 115(1).<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Deep, Alex. 2015. \u201cHybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques.\u201d <i>Small Wars Journal<\/i>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/jrnl\/art\/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/jrnl\/art\/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 02 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Deni, John R. 2017. \u201cMore of the Same in Response to Russia?\u201d <i>Carnegie Europe<\/i>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/strategiceurope\/74811\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/carnegieeurope.eu\/strategiceurope\/74811<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 02 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Der Spiegel. 2016. Russia&#8217;s Propaganda Campaign Against Germany. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/europe\/putin-wages-hybridwar-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.spiegel.de\/international\/europe\/putin-wages-hybridwar-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>,\u00a0 Accessed on 28 January 2022.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Dupont, Alan. 2003. \u201cTransformation or Stagnation? Rethinking Australia&#8217;s Defence.\u201d <i>Australian Journal of International Affairs<\/i>, 57(1): 55-76.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>EURACTIV. 2017. \u201cTillerson: Russian Vote Meddling was \u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019\u201d <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/global-europe\/news\/tillerson-russian-vote-meddling-was-hybrid-warfare\/\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.euractiv.com\/section\/global-europe\/news\/tillerson-russian-vote-meddling-was-hybrid-warfare\/<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>.\u00a0 Accessed on 3 February 2022.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>FRANCE24. 2018. \u201cGerman troops face Russian &#8216;hybrid war&#8217; in Lithuania: Merkel\u201d<\/span><\/span><\/span> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/20180914-german-troops-face-russian-hybrid-war-lithuania-merkel\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/20180914-german-troops-face-russian-hybrid-war-lithuania-merkel<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 21 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Glenn, Russell W. 2009. \u201cThoughts on \u201cHybrid\u201d Conflict.\u201d <i>Small Wars Journal<\/i>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/blog\/journal\/docs-temp\/188-glenn.pdf\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/smallwarsjournal.com\/blog\/journal\/docs-temp\/188-glenn.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. \u00a0Accessed on 29 January 2021.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Hoffman, Frank G. 2007. <i>Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars<\/i>. Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Jordan, Larry J. 2008. <i>Hybrid War: Is the U.S. Army Ready for the Face of 21st Century Warfare?<\/i> Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Kuczy\u0144ski, Grzegorz. 2019. \u201cRussia\u2019s Hybrid Warfare in The Western Balkans.\u201d <i>Warsaw Institute<\/i>, Special Report. Warsaw: Poland. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Lasica, Daniel T. 2009. <i>Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory<\/i>. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span lang=\"EN-GB\" xml:lang=\"EN-GB\"><span><span>Mattis, N. James and Frank G. Hoffman. 2005.\u00a0 \u201cFuture Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.\u201d <i>Proceedings<\/i>, November 2005: 18\u201319. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>McWilliams, Sean J. 2009. <i>Hybrid War Beyond Lebanon: Lessons from the South African Campaign 1976 to 1989<\/i>. <a name=\"_Hlk96637144\" id=\"_Hlk96637144\">Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.<\/a><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Mockaitis, Thomas R. 1995. <i>British Counterinsurgency in the Post-imperial Era<\/i>. Manchester: Manchester University Press.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>McCuen<\/span><\/span><\/span><span><span><span>, John J. 2008. \u201cHybrid Wars\u201d. <i>Military Review<\/i> Mar\/Apr 2008 88(2): 107-113.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Murray, Williamson, and Peter R. Mansoor (eds). 2012. <i>Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><i><span><span><span>Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/i><span><span><span>. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Murray II, William C. 2017. <i>Hybrid Warfare Dilemmas in the Middle Colonies during the American Revolution<\/i>. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>NATO. 2010. \u201cBI-SC Input to a New Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats\u201d. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.act.nato.int\/images\/stories\/events\/2010\/20100826_bi-sc_cht.pdf\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.act.nato.int\/images\/stories\/events\/2010\/20100826_bi-sc_cht.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span> . Accessed on 10 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>NATO. 2014. Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/ic\/natohq\/official_texts_112964.htm\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/ic\/natohq\/official_texts_112964.htm<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>, Accessed on 26 January 2022.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>NATO. n.d. NATO\u2019s Response to Hybrid Threats. Last updated March 16, 2021, <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_156338.htm#:~:text=To%20deter%20hybrid%20threats%2C%20NATO,its%20deterrence%20and%20defence%20posture\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/topics_156338.htm#:~:text=To%20deter%20hybrid%20threats%2C%20NATO,its%20deterrence%20and%20defence%20posture<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 27 January 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Nemeth, William J. 2002. <i>Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare<\/i>. MA Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Popescu, Nicu. 2015. \u201cHybrid Tactics: Neither New nor Only Russian\u201d. <i>European Union Institute for Security Studies<\/i>, EU-ISS-ALERT January 2015.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/EUISSFiles\/Alert_4_hybrid_warfare.pdf\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/sites\/default\/files\/EUISSFiles\/Alert_4_hybrid_warfare.pdf<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>, Accessed on 29 January 2022.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Sahin, Kaan. 2017. \u201cGermany Confronts Russian Hybrid Warfare.\u201d <i>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<\/i>.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2017\/07\/26\/germany-confronts-russian-hybrid-warfare-pub-72636\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2017\/07\/26\/germany-confronts-russian-hybrid-warfare-pub-72636<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 29 January 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Shedd, David R. and Ivana Stradner. 2020. \u201cPutin Is Winning Russia\u2019s Hybrid War against America.\u201d <i>National Review<\/i>. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nationalreview.com\/2020\/12\/putin-is-winning-russias-hybrid-war-against-america\/\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.nationalreview.com\/2020\/12\/putin-is-winning-russias-hybrid-war-against-america\/<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 2 February 2022.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Simpson, Erin. M. 2005. Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The Economist. 2022. \u201cWhat is hybrid war, and is Russia waging it in Ukraine?\u201d <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/the-economist-explains\/2022\/02\/22\/what-is-hybrid-war-and-is-russia-waging-it-in-ukraine\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.economist.com\/the-economist-explains\/2022\/02\/22\/what-is-hybrid-war-and-is-russia-waging-it-in-ukraine<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 24 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). n.d. Hybrid Threats as a Concept. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.hybridcoe.fi\/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon\/\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.hybridcoe.fi\/hybrid-threats-as-a-phenomenon\/<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span> Accessed on 01 February 2022. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The European Commission. 2016. FAQ: Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats. <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/MEMO_16_1250\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/ec.europa.eu\/commission\/presscorner\/detail\/en\/MEMO_16_1250<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>,\u00a0 Accessed on 27 January 2022.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The New York Times. 2022. \u201c<\/span><\/span><\/span><span lang=\"TR\" xml:lang=\"TR\"><span><span>Russia, Ukraine and \u2018Hybrid Conflicts.\u201d <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/01\/31\/books\/review\/the-war-in-ukraines-donbas-david-marples.html\"><span lang=\"TR\" xml:lang=\"TR\"><span><span>https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2022\/01\/31\/books\/review\/the-war-in-ukraines-donbas-david-marples.html<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span lang=\"TR\" xml:lang=\"TR\"><span><span>. Accessed on 12 February 2022.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><a name=\"_Hlk95500142\" id=\"_Hlk95500142\"><span><span><span>The US Department of the Army. 2010. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>Hybrid Threat. Training Circular 7-100. <a name=\"_Hlk96716722\" id=\"_Hlk96716722\">Washington DC: US Department of the Army. <\/a><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The US Department of Army. 2011. Operations FM 3-0, C1. Washington DC: US Department of the Army. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The US Department of the Army. 2019. Army Doctrine Publications 3-0 Operations. Washington DC: U.S Department of the Army.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>The Wall Street Journal. 2022. \u201cRussians Have Already Started Hybrid War with Bomb Threats, Cyberattacks, Ukraine Says.\u201d <\/span><\/span><\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/russians-have-already-started-hybrid-war-with-bomb-threats-cyberattacks-ukraine-says-11644748413\"><span><span><span>https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/russians-have-already-started-hybrid-war-with-bomb-threats-cyberattacks-ukraine-says-11644748413<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><span><span><span>. Accessed on 15 February 2022.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>TRADOC G-2, Threat Tactics Report Compendium: ISIL, North Korea, Russia, and China. 2015. Fort Leavenworth, KS:<\/span><\/span><\/span> <span><span><span>TRADOC G-2 ACE Threat Integration. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span><span><span><span><span><span>Walker, Robert G. 1998. <i>Spec Fi: The United States Marines Corps and Special Operations<\/i>. MA Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u2018Hybrid Warfare\u2019: One Term, Many MeaningsBy Tarik Solmaz Introduction Russia&#8217;s recent aggression against Ukraine has brought renewed prominence to the debate around \u2018hybrid warfare\u2019 (see e.g., The Economist 2022; The<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1896187,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mo_disable_npp":"","fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/cndimages.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com\/breaking-news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/01\/IMG_2758-scaled-1.jpg","fifu_image_alt":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1348576","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"fifu_image_url":"https:\/\/cndimages.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com\/breaking-news\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/01\/IMG_2758-scaled-1.jpg","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1348576","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1348576"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1348576\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1896187"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1348576"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1348576"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.conservativenewsdaily.net\/breaking-news\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1348576"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}