Washington Examiner

George F. Will, constantly evolving.

George Will: A Journey of Intellectual Transformation

“Change is life’s only constant,” veteran Washington ⁢Post columnist George Will quipped in the introduction of his bestselling ⁢volume on baseball, Men ‌At Work. And how true that has⁤ turned out ⁢to be, not only for⁢ Will but also for the conservative intellectual‌ tradition to which⁣ he has dedicated more than 50 years of his ‍life.

I had ⁣the⁢ chance to sit down with Will earlier this year, and we spoke about his​ decadeslong intellectual⁤ transformation. When ⁤considered within the context of the⁢ conservative movement’s own evolution ⁤over that same ⁣period, Will’s journey is equal parts challenging and insightful, leaving us with yet more questions than answers.

A Shift in Perspective

In 1983, Will ⁤published a robust defense of “strong-government conservatism” in his acclaimed book, Statecraft as Soulcraft: What Government ‌Does. Based on​ a series​ of lectures he ‌gave at Harvard University two years prior, Will concisely argued​ that law is⁣ not merely concerned with external behavior but rather with the “inner life of man.”⁢ He posited that “a real conservatism” is one that uses government to “cultivate the best persons and the best in⁣ persons.” This is done ⁣through legislating morality, a practice that Will ⁤wrote the ⁢state‍ “should do ⁢more often.” And no⁣ domain of policy was to be immune, ​whether it was social‌ or⁤ economic. It all ⁢should act as a⁢ mode of soulcraft (“something that shapes and modifies ‍one’s soul ⁢or core being”).

But​ it is ⁣not that he simply wanted government to engage in soulcraft. Rather, he believed it was ⁤inevitable. The subtitle of⁣ Statecraft ⁣as Soulcraft, Will noted in our conversation, is What Government Does — “not⁤ what government should do but what government cannot help but do, which is have a shaping effect on the soul.” The relevant question, then, became what laws would have ⁢the best‍ molding ⁤effect on⁣ the soul ⁣rather than⁣ if it⁣ is the government’s proper ⁤role to mold it in the first place.

Statecraft as Soulcraft, Will explained ⁣at the‍ time, was⁣ supposed⁣ to serve as “an amendment ⁣to current conservatism.”​ He told me that he thought “conservatism at that time was a little bit too much Milton Friedman,” and he wanted to emphasize that “there ‍was more to looking ⁢at politics ⁣than⁣ looking at economic growth, GDP, and happy consumers.” Additionally, he thought there was a deep defect in America’s founding philosophy: It ‌was too focused on constraining self-interest, among the lowest common denominators of human passions, and⁣ not enough‌ on nurturing virtue⁤ through‌ law.

But with age, Will came to believe he⁤ may have been mistaken in his ‍younger years. His 2019 tome, The Conservative Sensibility, corrects for what he ⁤saw as his prior errors.

A New Perspective on the American Founding

First and foremost, Will has a new perspective on the American founding ⁢and, by extension, what he ‌sees⁣ the job of conservatives to be. To address the second topic first: It is to conserve the philosophy of the American⁣ founding and, in so doing,‍ be “the custodians of the classical liberal tradition.”

Will’s retreat from “strong-government ⁤conservatism”⁤ and toward classical liberalism, he told me, ⁤entails a far more ⁤”jaundiced ‍view of government.” He‌ arrived at such a view​ by seeing firsthand, over many⁢ decades,⁣ the ways ​in‍ which expansive​ government power is used to enrich those involved with it. “Elizabeth Warren has ​a firm​ grip on half a point,” Will ‌said: “Five of the 10⁣ wealthiest‌ counties‍ in the United States by‍ per capita income are in the Washington area, which is a lot considering we don’t make anything except laws, regulations, and trouble.” It can only be explained, he said, by the trillions of dollars ⁤”sloshing” through the area, being diverted every ⁣which ⁢way with significant influence from “well-funded, well-lawyered interest groups.” In other ‌words, big⁣ government means ⁢big trouble. Seeing the repeated folly of government intervention and expansion allowed him to reevaluate his criticism of the⁤ American founding as not being ambitious ‍enough. He has seen‌ what government ambition means‍ in ⁤practice, and he wants nothing to do with ⁢it.

Intimately connected to this was ‍his shift on economics. The market-skeptical Will of​ 1983 underestimated, he told me, “the soulcraft effect of ⁣capitalism.” The Conservative Sensibility noted that⁢ a market society ‍”does not⁣ merely make us better off, it ⁢makes us better.” How? He said, “It ⁤produces a ‍certain kind of citizen and‍ a ‍certain kind of society. The shorthand is, it produces a⁤ polite society, a cooperative society, a society that doesn’t ⁣just presuppose ‍trust, it enkindles trust.”​ This means a laissez-faire approach to economics actually promotes virtue. These ⁢days, “I⁢ take my Milton Friedman straight and on ⁢the rocks,” Will said, underscoring the shift with ‍his characteristic wit.

A Changing Conservative Movement

What, then, in Will’s thinking has stayed the same?⁢ He believes today,⁣ just as he did in 1983, that ‌government shapes the inner soul of the individual person and that soulcraft is the inevitable consequence of statecraft. Consequently, the phrase “value-neutral ⁢government”⁣ is a “contradiction in terms.” But‍ as a practical matter, on general grounds of rule utilitarianism, Will believes a​ more ⁢”hands-off approach” ⁢results in more favorable outcomes. He came‌ to believe the spontaneous order of an‌ open society promotes the virtues he ⁣sees⁢ as crucial. ⁣But by achieving those virtues through only limited intervention, it is far more likely ‍to succeed.

Succinctly, the‌ George⁤ Will of 1983 ⁢is not the George Will of 2023.

Nor was the conservative ‍movement of 1983 the conservative movement of 2023. ⁤After all,⁣ Will’s shift did not happen in ⁤a vacuum. In the same period that he went from a Burkean to a Madisonian, the rest of the conservative movement had its own‌ transformation that was drastically different in kind.

In the early Reagan years, Will said, ‍the conservative movement‌ could be characterized by the beliefs that “the ⁣’60s and ’70s had been full of self-refuting experiments” and ⁤that “if government ⁢would​ get out of the ​way of the creative ⁣energies of the⁤ American people, [then] wonderful things were going to happen.” There‌ was a ‍type of optimism that was at least partially ‍a ⁣product of Reagan’s⁣ personality. Matthew Continetti pointed out in his book The Right:⁤ The Hundred-Year War for American Conservatism that Reagan “believed‍ in the innate goodness ⁣of people,” “had an uncanny ability to shrug off bad news,” and “distilled his approach in simple, clarifying language.”

But that era is now long gone. Today, there is “an itch on the ⁤part of conservatives to match‍ the progressives in using government to advance the conservative agenda by punishing ⁤the liberal agenda,” Will said. ⁢They want to ‌emulate the liberals in “gain[ing] power ‌so they can wield it and wield it ⁣with a firm smack.” There is also a move toward ⁤interventionist economic policy among the‍ ascendant ⁤”New Right” coalition, ‌aimed ‌at ‍rebuilding Middle America from the top down — ⁣a position ‍not ​substantially different​ in kind from that of liberals.

There ⁢are various compelling reasons that could explain this ideological shift. In his book Alienated America, the Washington Examiner’s Tim Carney detailed how the collapse ‍of a vigorous civil society, a ​collapse he argued was brought on by​ the dual threats of hyperindividualism and​ hypercentralization, led to, well, ‍alienation. Churches and other community ⁢institutions emptied out. Fewer ​people were ⁤getting married and ⁣having⁤ children.⁤ Anxiety, depression, drug addiction, and suicide rose. The blame was put at the feet ⁣of “the elites,” whether it was deserved or not,​ and ‌therefore, a populist backlash became ⁣almost inevitable.

Will immediately shoots down the ⁣idea there was anything inevitable about the path the conservative movement took. When asked why ⁤he‍ believed this shift has⁣ taken place,⁤ he said that “we’d have to have ⁣a deep ‍dive into the political sociology”‌ of the period ⁢since 2000. He added‍ that no matter the cause,‌ we can understand the modern Republican Party as being the party of people “who resent being condescended to,” are upset with the “allocation of ⁣status”⁢ in American ‌society, and “found in Donald Trump a megaphone, someone​ who spoke to that feeling.” While Will did not specifically outline his views on ‍the ⁣root causes, embedded in that​ answer seems ⁣to be an adequate explanation for the rise of the “New Right” ‌that itself is not substantially different than Carney’s: It tries to address ⁢the phenomena that produced such resentment. The problem is it may also perpetuate that sense of ⁢victimhood in rhetoric​ while, ⁢despite its⁢ promises, having no realistic solution⁣ for ⁢it in policy. However, classical⁤ liberalism does not truly have ‌an answer either. It is not clear how the virtues cultivated within the market, for example, do much to promote family,‍ religion, or community. But⁣ any real alternative‍ to the “New Right” must have something to say about ‍the phenomena ⁢causing its ascent.

Moving Forward

It is clear, then, that⁤ both ⁤Will and the conservative movement have undergone significant transformations since the‍ early 1980s ‌yet ended up in quite different places. Will came to believe the dynamism inherent to an open society must be a⁣ cornerstone of ‌a distinctly American conservative philosophy. Many others have moved in ‍the exact opposite direction, closer philosophically to where Will was​ in⁣ 1983.

This leaves us with the question of how conservatives with an aversion to the rising intellectual currents, and dominant​ political‌ ones, of today’s conservative movement ought ​to move forward and approach this particular moment. Will had some ‌”good news about the bad news.” “The bad⁢ news,” he said, “is ‌that Donald Trump showed​ how one person with no guardrails,⁣ one person with no inhibitions …​ can change the tone of the‍ country ​and raise up a cohort that fills an echo chamber of people like him.” ‌What this means‍ on the flip side, though, is ⁤that “maybe a really ​much ⁢better kind of person can have a much better kind of effect.” The basis for such ‍an idea ⁣lies in⁢ the‍ fact that we have a‌ “presidential-centric politics ⁢now.” As such, the president⁢ has an ‌incredible ‌ability not only ​to reflect the attitude of ‌the country ⁢back ​on itself but actually shape it as well. In fact, just as government policy cannot help but ‌shape the soul of the individual ⁣person, so too⁤ a president cannot help but shape the attitude and tone of the country.

I asked Will if he ‌had any guidance for young conservatives⁤ in navigating this moment. In an age in which almost 40% of Gen Zers get ⁣their news from Instagram, Will’s message is ⁣simple: “Read the great texts: Tocqueville and the Federalist​ Papers.” And, maybe most importantly, “If you want‍ to know basically what ⁣America ⁣is about, you have to immerse yourself in ​Abraham Lincoln.” The great insight that emerges from⁣ Lincoln’s ⁤thought⁤ and career, Will contended, is that “America is ⁣not about ‍a process, majority rule. ⁢It is about a‌ condition, liberty.” And to the extent people forget that certain questions, those concerning ‌fundamental liberties, are “beyond the reach of majorities,” they forget ‌what the substantive ​character of America is supposed ⁢to be.

Will’s insight into ‌the ⁤best ways ⁢to ⁣move forward is crucial. It would do us well to internalize them. Yet⁣ the prospects of Republican⁢ voters choosing an alternative to‌ Trump, ⁢or there ⁣being a true renaissance of young people reading the “great texts,” seem ⁤to ⁢be ⁣getting worse, not better.‍ It is ⁤one thing to diagnose what⁢ has gone wrong and tell people to ‌do the opposite. It is an ⁤entirely different thing to have specific, actionable ideas on how to inspire ⁣people‌ to⁣ do those things. ⁤It is not clear whether Will, or really anybody, ‌for that matter, has brought such ideas to the fore. This is⁤ quite concerning,‍ as are many of‍ the other⁣ social trends of our era, but only time will tell how things will play‍ out.

We already know “change is life’s only⁣ constant.”⁢ And there is ⁣no reason to think‌ the next 40 years will be any⁣ different in that respect ​than the last⁣ 40. But one of ‍the final ⁢reflections Will offered in our conversation was that “in a democracy, it’s [a system of] persuasion, and therefore, it requires patience.” And so, as ⁤he eloquently wrote at the end of‌ The Conservative Sensibility, “we should ‍beat on, boats against many modern currents, borne back ceaselessly toward a still-usable‍ past.”

Jack Elbaum was a summer 2023 Washington Examiner fellow.

What factors ​have influenced Will’s shift from strong-government conservatism to classical liberalism and limited government?

‍Nner life ​of individuals and society.⁤ However, his understanding of how government should⁢ shape⁤ that inner life⁤ has ⁢evolved. He no longer sees ​government as the solution to all societal problems,‌ but rather as a potential⁤ cause of ⁣trouble and corruption⁤ when it becomes too expansive.

Will’s journey of intellectual transformation mirrors the evolution of the conservative ‌movement over the past few decades.‌ The movement ‍has shifted from‌ a focus ⁤on⁣ strong-government ⁤conservatism⁢ to ⁣a renewed emphasis on classical liberalism and limited government. This change in perspective has been​ driven by a reevaluation‌ of the effects of government intervention and expansion, as well as a recognition of the soulcraft effect of capitalism.

One of the⁣ key aspects of Will’s transformation is his new perspective on ​the American founding.​ He now sees the‌ job of conservatives as the custodians of the classical liberal tradition and the philosophy of the founding fathers. This entails a more ⁤jaundiced view of government, recognizing the ways in which expansive government power can be ‍abused ⁢and lead to corruption. Will’s own experience in Washington,‌ D.C., where ​he has ⁢witnessed the wealth⁤ and influence concentrated ‌in the hands of those connected to the government, has shaped this perspective.

Additionally, Will’s shift‍ on⁢ economics is significant. He now recognizes the soulcraft⁣ effect of capitalism,⁤ understanding ‌that a market society not only‌ makes individuals⁢ better off but ⁢also makes them ⁢better. The market promotes⁢ virtue ⁣and trust, and a‍ laissez-faire approach to economics can ‍foster a polite and cooperative society.

Despite these changes, Will still maintains his belief in the role of government in shaping the inner life‌ of individuals and society. ​He continues to emphasize‌ the importance​ of law​ and the need⁣ for legislation to cultivate ​the best in people and promote virtue. However, he now approaches this role with caution, recognizing the potential ⁣dangers of ‌expansive government power.

In conclusion, George Will’s journey of intellectual transformation reflects the ​evolving nature⁤ of the ⁤conservative movement. His shift from strong-government conservatism to classical liberalism and limited government ⁣is driven ‌by a ‍reevaluation of the effects of government intervention ‌and expansion, as⁤ well as a recognition of the soulcraft effect of capitalism. This ​transformation has led to a more jaundiced view of government and a ⁤renewed ​focus on conserving the philosophy of the American founding. Despite these changes, Will still believes in the‌ role of ​government in shaping the ‍inner life of individuals​ and society, but approaches this role with caution.


Read More From Original Article Here: The changing George F. Will

" Conservative News Daily does not always share or support the views and opinions expressed here; they are just those of the writer."
*As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases
Back to top button
Available for Amazon Prime
Close

Adblock Detected

Please consider supporting us by disabling your ad blocker