Despite his hopeful rhetoric, halting the war in Sudan could prove to be among his most difficult tasks yet.

What are the difficulties in getting involved?

One of the primary issues facing Trump is the moral ambiguity of the civil war itself. Most analysts view the choice of who to back as a choice between a greater and lesser evil. The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces were the two main belligerents who carried out the Darfur genocide that spurred so much U.S. interest in the 2000s, and both carried out the 2019 massacre that sparked the #blueforsudan social media campaign.

The crimes of the RSF are better known, in part because it carried out the greatest crime of the war so far in El Fasher.

However, the SAF is replete with its own problems, viewed by some analysts as equally bad as the RSF. Despite having the prestige of being Sudan’s historical military, the civil-war SAF is more a hodgepodge of militias. Sudan specialist and human rights researcher Jehanne Henry explained that the SAF is “not much of an army,” being more a collection of militia groups aligning themselves with the SAF and fully reliant on foreign help.

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Though the RSF’s crimes have received more attention, Henry views the groups as roughly morally equivalent. The fog of war means there is not enough evidence to “scientifically conclude that one side is worse than the other.”

Karr views the RSF as worse, saying their engagement in ethnic cleansing and possible genocide puts it over the edge.

All this presents a moral conundrum.

The state of the conflict after the fall of El Fasher also presents its own difficulties. With the fall of the last SAF stronghold in Darfur, Sudan has essentially been split in two. Both Karr and Henry agree that the war has largely turned into a stalemate, with neither party strong enough to seize the others’ territory.

With the prospect of decisive defeat off the table, neither side will be enthusiastic about giving up its hard-won gains.

What levers can Trump pull?

The descent into a proxy war simultaneously serves as one of the greatest barriers and benefits to any U.S. approach to ending the war. The main players on both sides are major U.S. partners, meaning the United States holds the unique ability to steer the conflict, but also faces jeopardizing its vested interests.

The civil war is now largely viewed as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Egypt backing the SAF and the United Arab Emirates backing the RSF. All three major powers are reliant on the U.S., though also vital to the U.S.’s interests.

Though the SAF is backed by more countries of greater size and ability, none has been able to match the level of support the UAE has given to the RSF.

The key player in bringing an end to the civil war is the UAE. The tiny Arab state, nicknamed “Little Sparta” for its military prowess and ability to punch above its weight, single-handedly revived the RSF’s fortunes in 2025 after it lost the pivotal Battle of Khartoum. It is widely alleged to have supplied funds, weapons, intelligence, supplies, mercenaries, drones, and other benefits to give the paramilitary group a major advantage over its rival.

The UAE’s alleged influence over the RSF is so great that it has even been able to control some tactical movements. Karr noted an event during the civil war in which Abu Dhabi was able to force the RSF to call off a planned massacre after the prospect received international scrutiny.

The UAE is also one of the U.S.’s most central allies in the Middle East. Aside from extensive economic ties, the UAE is also an invaluable player in one of Trump’s most ambitious diplomatic feats — the Abraham Accords. The UAE and Bahrain were the first Arab countries to recognize Israel under the 2020 agreement, helping ease the taboo among Muslim countries.

Washington could ill afford to lose the UAE’s involvement in the pact, especially over a priority as low as Sudan. In contrast, Sudan is one of the UAE’s main foreign policy priorities.

The UAE has also been a valuable partner in Washington’s priority of combating the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islamism. Abu Dhabi has exploited the SAF’s Islamist elements to justify its covert stance in Sudan. The UAE’s valuable role was acknowledged by the Biden administration, which prevented it from trying to restrain Abu Dhabi in Africa.

“Officials within the Biden admin have been quoted as basically saying something to the effect of, ‘Look, we want to do something, but we need the UAE in the Middle East with everything going on, so we’re not willing to push the issue on Sudan or on Africa stuff,’” Karr said.

Karr argued this interpretation was a mistake. By giving the UAE a free hand in Africa, instability has spread across the region, especially with other allies such as Saudi Arabia. Every neighbor of Sudan has been affected by the resulting refugee crisis, particularly South Sudan.

While explicitly backing the SAF might be a mistake, Karr argued Trump should maneuver to rein in the UAE’s backing of the RSF through diplomatic means. The foremost way to do this would be to designate the RSF a terrorist organization.

“By doing that, it opens the door to U.S. investigations into the third parties that are supplying the RSF and potential penalties,” Karr said. “I think that this is preferable to what some Congressmembers have called for, which is just banning all weapon shipments to the UAE.

“Designating the RSF as a terror group basically allows you to go after the direct entities, even if they’re Emirati-linked, that are doing this without necessarily blanket punishing the UAE writ large, which the UAE would not take kindly to, whether they deserve it or not.”

The move would serve as a diplomatic way to largely cut off Emirati weapons shipments to the RSF — something the UAE already insists it is not doing.

The next step in Karr’s plan would be to offer substantial “carrots” to the UAE, even going along with some of its aims in Sudan.

To get the UAE and SAF on the same page, Karr urged Washington to “continue to put pressure on the SAF’s Islamist ties, because the UAE has flagged that as a big issue,” adding that the Trump administration has already shown substantial interest in this.

The UAE’s primary interest in Sudan is economic. Khartoum’s stripping the UAE of big economic deals, such as canceling a $6 billion Emirati deal to develop Port Sudan, has pushed Abu Dhabi to back the government’s rival in hopes of reasserting its presence in the country. Karr believes Trump should center his tried-and-true peacemaking method of blending economics with diplomacy as part of a peace deal.

“Another thing that they can do is try to broker some kind of deal that protects Emirati interests in the country, and doesn’t just totally object the UAE from Sudan, which would lead it to dig in its heels,” Karr said, suggesting the postwar government embrace UAE investment deals in infrastructure and the shattered economy.

Henry also believes that cutting the spigot of weapons to Sudan is the decisive factor in halting the war. The SAF has become as reliant on foreign weapons and supplies, mainly from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, so Trump could try to wield the U.S.’s diplomatic influence to cut weapons shipments to both factions.

“The idea now is that either side is relying on external actors for its strength, and if the international marketplace could stop supplying these goods to either side, then that would stem the war,” Henry said. “That would dampen the fighting.”

Trump must find a way to wrangle the many conflicting regional interests, coming up with a framework similar to the Quad, a peacemaking body composed of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.

Karr views the Quad as still the most viable peacemaking outfit.

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“I think that the Quad can be saved, and it’s still a workable and good kind of formulation, but there needs to be higher-level engagement with it,” he argued, saying more pressure must be exerted to carry out its decisions.

Yemen showed how quickly a cutoff of UAE support can disintegrate its proxies. After Saudi Arabia delivered an ultimatum for Abu Dhabi to withdraw support for the Southern Transition Council, the group, which entrenched itself in southern Yemen over a decade, collapsed in under two weeks.