Charles Lipson: Putin’s Inhumane War Strategy Is Backfiring

After Vladimir Putin failed to take control of Kyiv and overthrow the government there one year ago, the war in Ukraine was fundamentally changed. His army settled into Russia’s traditional way of war: a slow, brutal, relentless slugfest. This strategy costs many Russian lives. Untrained troops are used in human-wave attacks. They can be taken from prisons or on the streets. The idea is to use these expendable men to weaken Ukraine’s front-line defenses and then follow them with more sophisticated attacks by Russia’s battle-hardened troops.

While this strategy has resulted in many deaths on both sides, it has only produced minor Russian gains. The surprise invasion of Ukraine a year ago brought about the biggest gains. Russia has lost ground over the years, sometimes slowly but sometimes rapidly, such as when Ukraine took back Kharkov oblast, north.

The losses were terrible. Russia deliberately bombed civil infrastructure including electric and water supply, homes, schools and hospitals. They also executed civilians and kidnapped children from Ukraine. It’s not an enigma. It is a war crime, wrapped inside Russia’s conventional way of war.

Despite the pain and suffering that Ukraine has endured, they are not giving up on their dreams. Destroying that was at the heart of Russia’s strategy, and it has failed. For all its losses, what Ukraine has gained is a strong sense about its nationhood and its rights to decide its sovereign destiny.

Russia continues to launch offensives and bomb civilian infrastructure, as they have no other military options than nuclear escalation which they have repeatedly threatened. Russia’s military is being micromanaged by an isolated, poorly informed, and amateurish politician. He sits at the ends of long tables, worried about his regime and his own life.

Putin has fallen prey to his own foolish gamble and must be aware of it. He doesn’t have good alternatives to his current military strategy of doubling down, mobilizing more troops, and launching another major offensive. This offensive is fraught with serious risks. His army could fall if it fails, which is a military risk. The political risk is that people will resist mobilization, especially in important cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. Even greater risk is his removal by Kremlin insiders. They are exposed to risks, mostly through windows in tall buildings.

Risky as it is for Russia to double down, it is really the Kremlin’s only path to victory. After they’ve buried so many veterans and reduced their stock of precision weapons, this would be only a partial victory. Russia now has a large arsenal of outdated, deadly, but accurate weapons, ammunition warehouses, and an army that is barely more than 2,000 strong. “meat,” Logistics that depend on fragile rail transport, which stops far away from the frontlines, and a top down command structure that cannot adapt and change quickly to changing battlefield conditions.

Doing the same thing with more intensity and desperation may be Putin’s only option. But it won’t work.

It won’t recapture new territory or hold the lands he captured in February and March last year. It won’t break the will of the Ukrainian people, who have been forged into a coherent, fighting nation by the unprovoked Russian assault and galvanized by Volodymyr Zelensky’s brilliant leadership.

It won’t cut off Ukraine from access to the Black Sea, as Putin hoped last year. It won’t allow Russia to move beyond Ukraine and incorporate the Russian population in eastern Moldova (Transnistria), just west of Odessa.

It won’t break NATO, as Putin initially hoped and perhaps still does. Indeed, Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression has increased the alliance’s unity, given it new purpose, and added to its future membership, once Erdoğan’s opposition to Sweden and Finland is overcome. The prospect of new NATO members on St. Petersburg’s doorstep is a strategic catastrophe for the Kremlin.

Most of all, the renewed offensive won’t produce Russian victory. Putin’s only real hope now is a war of attrition. The goal is to wear down NATO’s long-term support for Ukraine, either because of financial costs or the risk of escalation. Putin’s calculation must be that Kyiv would be forced to cede territory in a compromise settlement if Western support ebbs. He could then claim victory on behalf of Mother Russia and become its standard bearer.

Putin’s dream world can’t be ruled out, but it is extremely unlikely. A Ukrainian regime that withdraws from its sovereign territory permanently would not be able to survive. It has fought too long and paid too much. The most any Ukrainian leaders could concede would be a ceasefire, where low-level fighting would continue as it did after Russia’s 2014 invasion. Both sides would immediately prepare for another full-scale battle. Western leaders may propose as part of the deal “internationalizing” Crimea would be left in limbo as its final sovereignty. This would also be unacceptable for Kyiv as a long-term solution. Russia would also consider it impossible if Russia lost control of Sevastopol, the anchoring point for their Black Sea fleet.

There’s one more enormous obstacle to any compromise. The West won’t let Russia walk away from its horrific catalog of war crimes, which implicate hundreds of senior military and political leaders. Russia will not give up these criminals unless the regime is completely changed. Perhaps even not. Without trials in The Hague and an elimination of Moscow’s virulent nationalist leadership, Russia will continue to be treated as a pariah, its economy still subject to extensive sanctions.

Two problems arise from a compromise agreement. The first concern is to gain acceptance from Moscow and Kyiv. The second is making it last. A compromise that gives Russia control of Ukrainian territory is inherently unstable. It would be a permanent military threat to Ukraine and stop it from rebuilding its economy, and society according to Western standards.

Ferdinand Foch, a French general, meant instability like this when he gave a dim assessment on the settlement that ended the Great War. “This is not peace,” He spoke highly of the Versailles Treaty. “It is an armistice for 20 years.” He was within a month of his forecast. Similar forecasts for Ukraine would be likely to be off by at least a decade.

That’s why Moscow is beginning its new assault, hoping to win on the battlefield. (They won’t.) That’s why Kyiv fights on, at great cost. That’s why Ukraine’s allies, meeting monthly at Germany’s Ramstein Air Base, are ramping up their supplies of heavy weapons, hoping to avoid a major escalation by doing it cautiously. The goal of these weapons is still a matter of contention between the allies. Is it intended to stop Russia’s victory as Paris, Berlin and Washington desire? Or are they designed to ensure victory for Ukraine, as London and Warsaw want, or the Baltics?

The crunch is not likely to come this spring unless Russia’s major offensive succeeds unexpectedly. It is likely to happen in the summer as Ukraine attempts to retake Crimea. This will be done by first cutting its land bridge with Russia (in Zaporizhzhiaoblast), then missile attacks, and finally a risky landing assault. Russia has already begun preparations for the forthcoming battle.

It was not expected that Europe would see another major war. Russia’s invasion ended the fantasy of permanent peace on the continent and caught NATO flatfooted. Both the Russians as well as the Ukrainians have fought far too hard and cost too much. They also lost too many people to compromise. Even if they reach an agreement, it will likely be a temporary ceasefire and unstable. They are much more likely not to stop fighting until one side wins.