Bombshell Report Reveals CCP Student Espionage

A student newspaper at Stanford University dropped a bombshell report earlier this month revealing “there are Chinese spies at Stanford.”

The report, titled “Uncovering Chinese Academic Espionage at Stanford,” was published by The Stanford Review, an independent student-run newspaper. This alarming investigation is based on “over a dozen interviews conducted between July 2024 and April 2025, involving Stanford faculty members, current and former students, and independent experts specializing in Chinese intelligence operations and technology transfer.”

The report highlights three critical findings. First, it exposes that the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Ministry of State Security (MSS) is actively recruiting or coercing Chinese students and scholars at Stanford to serve as “non-traditional” intelligence assets. The MSS demands these individuals gather information that it deems valuable. Rather than targeting classified documents, the MSS is focused on obtaining “the know-how behind American innovation,” which encompasses “conclusions from Stanford research projects, methodologies, software, lab workflows, collaborative structures, and even communication channels.” The agency is particularly interested in information related to artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics.

Fears of Harassment, Losing Scholarships

The Stanford report underscores a critical nuance: not all Chinese students and scholars on campus are engaged in espionage for China. However, those who are involved often operate under vastly different motivations. While some choose to cooperate with the MSS voluntarily, others are unwitting victims of their government, acting out of fear, as highlighted by the Stanford Review. Reports indicate that some Chinese students feel pressured by MSS handlers in the U.S. who closely monitor their actions. The threat of repercussions, such as harassment of their family members back in China, looms large for these students.

Moreover, a pervasive fear of losing scholarships supplied by the Chinese government plays a significant role in this dynamic. The Stanford Review highlights the China Scholarship Council (CSC), a leading Chinese government agency that funds between 7 and 18 percent of Chinese students studying in the United States. Its sponsorship comes with stringent conditions: Students must align their research with state priorities, particularly those outlined in the government’s “Made-in-China 2025” industrial initiative. Furthermore, scholarship recipients must pass a loyalty test, pledge allegiance to the CCP, and agree to return to China upon completing their studies.

In addition, while studying in the U.S., the CSC mandates that sponsored students submit regular “situation reports” detailing their research to Chinese diplomatic missions, further emphasizing the controlling nature of this scholarship program. These students’ family members in China often serve as guarantors of these scholarships, and these guarantors will face financial penalties should their students “violate” the arrangement or refuse to go back to China.

Extended Period of Spying

The most concerning revelation of the report is that China’s academic espionage at Stanford has persisted for an extended period. Yet, many who are aware of it have chosen to remain silent. Chinese students hesitate to speak out, knowing they are being monitored by the MSS handlers or fellow Chinese students. Americans also tend to remain quiet, fearing accusations of “racism” or the potential to undermine the university’s financial ties with China. After all, Stanford has received more than $64 million in anonymous donations from China since 2010. These factors explain why most interviewees for the Stanford Review insisted on anonymity.

China’s espionage operations at Stanford are not isolated incidents but part of a broader pattern. U.S. intelligence agencies have warned that American universities are soft targets for China’s state-sponsored intellectual property theft. A chilling example of this occurred in 2020, when the FBI issued an arrest warrant for Yanqing Ye, who didn’t disclose her affiliation with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on her student visa application. While studying at Boston University, she allegedly “continued to work as a PLA Lieutenant, completing assignments assigned by PLA officers.”

How to Address the Problem

At times, the Chinese government recruits individuals who are not Chinese to carry out its agenda at American universities. However, it is undeniable that the majority of the CCP’s espionage activities on American college campuses are conducted by Chinese students and scholars. The challenge lies in how the U.S. government and American universities can address this issue without resorting to an identity-based witch hunt.

To begin with, we must dismantle the prevailing culture of silence on this topic. As noted by the Stanford Review, “the status quo of labeling those who discuss this issue as racist must end.” Advocacy groups representing Asian Americans, specifically Chinese Americans, should recognize that the only way to genuinely protect innocent individuals of Chinese descent from unfair targeting is to candidly address the CCP’s spy activities on campuses. Rather than weaponizing the concept of “racism” to shut down important conversations, these groups need to take the lead in openly acknowledging that the CCP’s spying operations present a serious threat to America’s technological leadership, innovation, and national security. By fostering an open dialogue, we can tackle this pressing issue constructively and responsibly.

American universities must take proactive actions as well. Given the higher likelihood of students sponsored by the CSC being compromised, universities should seriously consider halting their acceptance altogether. It’s critical for these students to understand that the CCP’s pervasive espionage activities create an environment where they are not welcome in the United States.

Moreover, American universities should work hand in hand with the U.S. government to ensure that any student caught engaging in espionage for the CCP faces immediate visa revocation and expulsion. The old adage, “sunlight is the best disinfectant,” rings true here. The more we expose these activities by reporting and sharing every incident publicly, the more we empower the public to recognize and combat this threat, and the more we deter Chinese students from participating in the CCP’s operations.

Finally, the Trump administration must maintain a clear perspective on the extensive challenges that the CCP presents, which go far beyond mere trade disputes. As highlighted in the Stanford Review report, “The nation that develops superior technologies will gain a critical military edge over its adversaries. China cannot be that nation.” Therefore, U.S.-China negotiations should address issues beyond trade, specifically the CCP’s espionage operations on American campuses. The Trump administration should firmly refuse any trade agreements until Beijing takes tangible steps to mitigate its aggressive actions on U.S. territory.