China’s Expanding Navy Is A Threat To U.S. National Security

On April 24, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report on China’s naval modernization, noting that, “China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and 2020 it surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships …” The CRS report then quotes the DOD, that China’s navy “is the largest navy in the world …”

As an Asian land power, why would China be rapidly expanding its navy?

A benign view of China’s naval buildup is that it is driven by its economic and security needs. As the world’s second-largest economy, it relies on maritime trade routes for energy and raw materials imports and exports of finished goods, making sea lane security paramount. Though, one might ask, security against what threat?

Of note, even though China has a base in Djibouti on the Red Sea, its navy has been wholly absent in keeping the vital waterway and path to the Suez Canal open in the face of piratical Houthi attacks on shipping. In fact, the U.S. government has credibly accused a Chinese satellite company of providing real-time intelligence to the Houthis to aid in their targeting of shipping, including the U.S. Navy. That China’s naval buildup and China’s increasing bellicosity align with paramount leader Xi Jinping’s vision of national rejuvenation linked to maritime command of the seas — far beyond Taiwan’s rocky shores.

Xi’s vision may be one of world domination, but can one nation truly dominate the world? Can a nation accumulate enough power, military and economic might, and allies or vassal states, to threaten America’s way of life or present an undeterred existential threat to our nation? And what nature might that threat take, for instance, a land power dominating the Eurasian landmass, or a maritime power controlling the oceans?

This last question, land or sea, is the heart of understanding the rapidly growing threat from China and how America must respond, or else everything we’ve enjoyed for more than 100 years comes to an end.

The geostrategic theory that land power can dominate the world was best expressed by the British geographer and statesman Halford Mackinder in his 1904 article, “The Geographical Pivot of History.” By 1919, Mackinder boiled his theory down to this, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world.”

Both Napoleon and Hitler resorted to war to make Mackinder’s theory a reality, parleying an invasion of Russia into world domination. But both failed the test of Russia’s harsh vastness and seemingly endless manpower reserves. The Soviet empire made a run of proving Mackinder right during the Cold War, but it was held in check by NATO, a U.S. marriage of convenience with China, and the utter economic failure of its Marxist ideology.

But is Mackinder still relevant? The globe’s economic, population, and resource center of gravity has shifted to the east, towards China. Accounting for that, can the path to ruling the world in 2025 still hew in spirit to Mackinder’s theory from 100 years ago?

In a word, no. Why? India. While China and India are effectively partitioned by the soaring Himalayan curtain, the fact remains that a rapidly growing and nuclear-armed India will, due to culture and mass, never accede to being a vasal of China. Nor can India be conquered, much less absorbed by China, thus making China’s domination of Asia by land nearly impossible.

So, if Mackinder no longer rules, who does? American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan and his sea power doctrine as expressed in two books, published in 1890 and 1892. Mahan was widely read, including by the naval officers of Imperial Japan and Imperial Germany.

Mahan’s theory of national power can be simply broken down thus: A powerful nation must have access to international markets. This is secured in three ways: a big merchant marine fleet; a blue water navy capable of deterring or destroying opposing fleets; and a global web of naval bases to fuel and supply the fleet and help keep sea lines of communication open.

China, by its actions, is pursuing Mahan’s advice with a vengeance.

Cargo ship dominance? In 2000, China built 5 percent of the world’s cargo ships. In 2023, that rose to a remarkable 50.7 percent. Last year, 62.4 percent of the world’s new ships were ordered from China.

A big naval fleet? China is rapidly expanding its navy as well as its naval shipyards, further accelerating the pace of its naval buildup. China’s navy is the world’s most numerous by hulls, with the U.S. still retaining an advantage in tonnage, at least for a few more years. China’s navy launches six ships for every 1.8 the U.S. commissions.

A worldwide web of naval ports? This has been China’s weakest area, but it is rapidly coming up to speed through a combination of Belt and Road Initiative investments, commercial ties, and diplomatic arrangements. China has stakes in or operates 115 port projects across 50+ countries. Of these, 17 have majority Chinese ownership, and 55 are estimated to have dual-use (civilian-military) potential.

China’s fleet, going by the unwieldy name of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, is expected to reach 395 ships this year, up 25 from 370 last year.

China’s decision to embrace Mahan rather than Mackinder, the sea rather than the land, rhymes with Imperial Japan’s decision in 1941 to pursue a southern strategy aimed at seizing the oil fields of present-day Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, rather than striking north into the resource-rich Soviet Union (then contending with Germany’s invasion from the west). China’s naval buildup also echoes that of Wilhelmine Germany, which, from 1890 to 1914, established coaling (refueling) ports in Africa and Asia while rapidly launching a modern fleet of battleships — actions that kicked off an arms race with Britain.

China’s decision to become a maritime superpower presents the greatest threat to the U.S. since the British burned down the White House in 1814. President Trump and his national security team have recognized the threat and are quickly rising to meet the challenge. The question is whether deterrence can be restored in time to maintain peace in the Pacific.